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ABSTRACT 
 
Mainstream development economics has typically concentrated on the contents of public policy, 
such as GNP per capita and investment rates, to the virtual exclusion of the processes that shape 
those contents and the people who are affected by public policies. This preoccupation with 
content has in turn translated into an inordinate focus on “hard indicators” of development, such 
as Gross Domestic Product and exchange rates, at the expense of “soft indicators” like citizens’ 
satisfaction with the contents and the process, a satisfaction which ideally should be part of the 
overall measure of the material and non-material progress of a nation.  
 
After more than 50 years of hard-indicator development economics, during which social 
disaffection with public policy appears to have risen alongside growing and widespread poverty, 
perhaps it is time to incorporate soft indicators into development discourse and thus offer society 
a more complete view of its development efforts – a view that would not only enrich the policy 
process but help it to yield outcomes that at the very least reflect the aspirations and satisfactions 
of the citizenry. This dissertation represents a modest attempt to foster such a complementarity in 
the development process, using Ghana’s Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative 
(SAPRI) as a case study. 
 
Held in Accra in 1997, SAPRI was an effort by civil society organizations to gain a greater role 
in the policy process, after nearly 20 years of structural adjustment, during which public policy 
was formulated by a technocratic few and at the end of which social conditions had deteriorated 
not improved.  Advocates of this “new participation,” or citizen engagement in development at 
the national rather than local level, argued that a participatory approach to national policy 
making was the surest way to “intercept” flawed policies at the national level before they 
become programs and projects at the local level.  
 
The success of such participation, as viewed by the participants, not organizers, was defined in 
terms of inclusiveness, voice, and impact. Questionnaires were sent to them and the data 
analyzed with non-parametric statistics.  Among other things, participants’ perceptions of 
inclusiveness were found to be conditioned significantly by such factors as the sex of respondent, 
despite efforts by organizers to promote “gender balance.” Female respondents, for example, 
were less likely than male respondents to view SAPRI as adequately inclusive of women and 
especially children’s issues, despite claims of representativeness by organizers. Voice – the 
 v
ability of citizens to make policy demands unhindered– was, as anticipated, associated more with 
the organizational arrangements of the process than any other postulated factors, such as 
analytical capacity of the participants’ organizations.  Overall, respondents’ views of the impact 
of their participation in SAPRI on public policy were surprisingly found to reflect existing hard 
indicators of development.  The view by majority of respondents, for example, that children’s 
issues received less attention at the forum was borne out by findings in the Ghana Core Welfare 
Indicators Questionnaire (2004) that the nutritional status of children under five years 
deteriorated severely between 1997 and 2003. 
 
The findings are situated within the context of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy, the 
localized version of the IMF-World Bank-inspired Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which 
considers “widespread civil society” participation as one of its strongest features.  
 vi
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Development, in theory and in practice, is slave to fashion.” 
 — Jan K. Black,  
Development in Theory and Practice:  Bridging the Gap 
 
 
If this observation by Black is anything to go by, then development economics in both 
theory and practice has found its latest fashion:  “Participation.”  Having gone through a phase 
where the state was the dominant actor in development, followed by a period of diminished state 
role, and then the prominence of markets, development practitioners and policy makers alike 
now see participation as the answer to the seemingly intractable problems of underdevelopment.  
At international conferences, in donor and creditor documents, in government policy statements, 
and in academic writings, no discussion of “economic development” now is considered complete 
without some reference to participation — the direct and indirect involvement of the public 
(particularly the poor and other marginalized groups) in the making of economic policy and the 
management of development.  Major donor countries now require evidence of citizen 
participation in development as a condition for aid to developing countries (see, e.g., USAID, 
1999; UNDP 2000; CIDA, 2001; World Bank 1994; United Nations, 1995).  At the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) there has since the early 1990s been an internet-
based “Participation Forum” where Agency staff around the world regularly discuss participation 
and offer electronic testimonials to their experiences in the field. Among the world’s growing 
number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) “participatory development” is now a well-
entrenched creed. And at the University of Sussex in England (home of the Institute of 
Development Studies), there is a Participation Group that seeks, through research, to “clarify the 
 2 
[various] meanings applied to participation and the realities of its impact on the ground” (IDS, 
2000).  More recently, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have 
introduced the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) which compel governments to 
demonstrate “broad civil society participation” in the formulation of the PRSPs in exchange for 
debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative of 1999.   
Participatory development as practiced in the past decade and a half, however, differs 
significantly from its cousin of earlier times. Unlike its predecessor, which focused on citizens’ 
involvement in the design and implementation of development projects in local communities, 
this new participation takes a step back and encourages citizen involvement in the making and 
implementation of national policies that have the potential to affect the larger economy, its 
various sub-sectors, and – indirectly – development projects at the local level.  Advocates of this 
new approach to participatory development have argued that to the degree that such macro-
economic and sectoral policies are essential to the success of individual development projects 
and programs, it is important that ordinary citizens be involved in their formulation (Abugre, 
2001). They contend that policies that reflect the inputs of ordinary citizens, the intended 
beneficiaries of those policies, enjoy greater public support and thus have a greater chance of 
implementation success than those without citizen inputs (Chambers and Guijt, 1995; Campos, 
1996; Campilan, 1997). 
In Ghana, there have been at least four major national exercises over the past decade, all 
aimed at promoting this new approach to participatory development.  Between 1993 and 1994, 
the government held a series of regional and sub-regional forums to formulate a long-term plan 
for the social and economic development of the country.  The result was a national document, 
Ghana: Vision 2020, which proposed to transform the country into a middle-income country by 
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the year 2020.  In 1997, a National Economic Forum, based on nation-wide public hearings, was 
held in Accra, the national capital, to review the general direction of the national economy and 
initiate policies to strengthen Vision 2020.  In the same year, the Structural Adjustment 
Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) was launched.  And in 2001, a National Economic 
Dialogue was held within a similar participatory framework, culminating in the Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRS) (see NDPC, 1994; SAPRIN, 1998; Government of Ghana, 
2002). 
Of these exercises, the most extensive (spanning four years), and the best documented (in 
terms of participants and the various activities involved) was SAPRI.  SAPRI thus lends itself 
best to the study of the new participation in Ghana, hence its selection for this study.  There is 
another reason why SAPRI deserves special attention.  It constituted the first citizen-inspired 
evaluation of development policy at the national level, against the background of external 
involvement in domestic policy formulation.  This was in sharp contrast to several previous ones 
where citizens’ “participatory evaluations” were largely restricted to local projects and programs 
(Amanor, 1990). This will not be the first time that SAPRI – in Ghana or any of the other 
participating countries, such as Ecuador, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe – has been evaluated 
(see, for example, World Bank, 2001; Britwum, et al., UNDP, 2001; and SAPRIN, 2002).  The 
key difference between this study and the others, however, is that an attempt is made for the first 
time to define and establish successful participation beyond the group and event level by giving 
the individual participants the opportunity to speak for themselves – to present the reality of 
participation as they, not external experts, see it.  In other words, this approach seeks to establish 
a micro-foundation for the macro-superstructure that has been the main measure of success in the 
new participation.  The emphasis thus is not on advocacy groups and the abstract phenomenon of 
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organizational success (which are the most common measures of participatory success), but 
rather on the aspirations and experiences of those who actually took part in participatory events. 
The dissertation takes the following form.  After the introduction (Chapter 1), a statement 
of the problem in Chapter 2 discusses the salient dimensions of successful participation and 
poses the various questions that will have to be answered in order to address the research 
problem.  Chapter 3 reviews the literature on participation from historical, theoretical, and 
procedural perspectives. This is followed by Chapter 4, which conceptualizes “participation” in 
its basic forms and addresses the issue of who qualifies to participate in the iterative and multi-
dimensional processes of policy formation.  Chapter 5 provides the substantive background to 
the study, tracing the history of structural adjustment in Ghana and its culmination in the 
Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI).  Chapter 6 reviews the structure 
and process of SAPRI, while Chapter 7 discusses the study’s design and data collection 
procedures.  Chapters 8 and 9, respectively, are devoted to the analysis and interpretation of the 
data, as well as the conclusion and policy implications of the study.   
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2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Assessments of citizen participation in the policy process have generally tended to define 
success merely by the number of participants involved, or the degree of complexity involved in 
bringing together various socio-economic groups, all of them not necessarily having a common 
history, objectives or strategies (e.g., see NDPC, 1994; Government of Ghana, 2001; 
Government of Ghana, 2002; IMF, 2002; SAPRIN, 2002).  However, such a yardstick for 
measuring participatory success, however insightful and gratifying to the organizers, has the 
potential to over-state the success of participation, if the ultimate objective is to empower the 
people to influence public policy.  For example, there may be a large number of people 
representing various advocacy groups but only a relatively small number of them could have 
attempted to make their desired policy representations at a participatory forum.  And of that 
number, fewer still may have been given the opportunity by the forum’s moderators to present 
most if not all of their groups’ policy demands. Subsequent reports about the participatory 
events, therefore, may be less representative of the views and policy issues of the various 
stakeholders than group and process evaluations would suggest. Policy legitimacy in the eyes of 
sections of the public may thus be compromised in the long run, as various groups begin to feel 
disaffected because they do not see public policy as reflecting their concerns and priorities. 
For purposes of this dissertation, a broader and measurable definition of successful 
participation is offered that reflects (1) the principle of democratic inclusiveness (or 
representativeness) implied in participatory development, (2) the functional objective of 
effectively soliciting policy demands from the citizenry, and (3) the ultimate expectation that 
those demands would in the future be incorporated into public policy in one form or another.  
With this alternative definition, therefore, the question is not simply one of whether or not 
participants representing various civil society and other groups took part in an elaborate public 
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forum characterized by complex organizational arrangements, but rather the participants’ 
perceptions of the extent of social inclusiveness, the degree to which they successfully put forth 
their policy demands at the forum, and the relative impact their participation subsequently have 
had on public policy. Success thus can be described and quantified in terms of these constituent 
elements of participation and the extent to which each participant believes it was attained.   This 
is the approach of this study and the unit of analysis, therefore, is the participant. 
 In attempting to establish the plausible determinants of successful participation, the study 
will address the following questions: 
i) To what extent were participants and their organizations representative of civil 
society? 
ii) To what degree did the issues discussed at the forum reflect the interests of civil 
society? 
iii) What was the level of economic literacy of participants? 
iv) What was the capacity of participants’ organizations to conduct policy analysis to 
facilitate their involvement in the process? 
v) To what extent were the Forum’s organizational arrangements deemed conducive to 
the presentation of policy demands by participants? 
vi) More than one year after SAPRI, how much, if any, did participants believe that their 
views have influenced public policy? 
vii) What were participants views about SAP pre- and post-SAPRI? 
viii) And, when all is said on done, does participation matter? 
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It is expected that the answers to these questions would help clarify or strengthen the 
public’s understanding of the “new participation” from a micro- or individual-level perspective 
and at the same time provide useful new information for the planning of future forums. 
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3. LITERATURE ON PARTICIPATION  
 
3.1. PARTICIPATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT   
 
The notion of citizen participation in national development dates back centuries, 
particularly in Europe and the United States, where it took the form of utopian communities in 
the 18th century (Gareth, 1996; Hardy, 2000).  Participatory development in developing 
countries, however, is of a more recent origin, having started in the early 1950s as “community 
development,” an integral part of contemporary development economics (Holdcroft, 1978; 
Chambers, 1983).  In this context, citizen participation in rural development projects became a 
standard part of development practice, financed largely by industrialized nations and the United 
Nations. Indeed, in 1951, a United Nations’ report on how to “develop the under-developed 
countries” noted: 
One of the most difficult problems connected with the planning and 
directing of economic activity is the tendency towards excessive 
centralization, which discourages individual effort.  The only way of 
meeting this is…to ensure that the political and economic planning 
mechanism provide the fullest scope, at each stage, for individual and local 
participation. (UN, 1951, par. 220)  
 
By the mid-1960s, however, “most national community development programs had been 
terminated or drastically reduced” (Holdcroft, 1978: 18). This decline in community development 
coincided with the growing realization within the international development community that 
orthodox economics had not significantly altered existing socio-economic institutions, with the 
result that deeply entrenched power relations and unequal distribution of productive assets had 
overwhelmed whatever progress might have been made in development the period 1950 to 1965.  
For example, village-level community development workers tended to align themselves more 
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with local power elites than with the poor and dispossessed.  “There was little attention given to 
assuring that benefits from community development programs accrued to the rural poor” 
(Holdcroft, 1978:  20). 
3.2. THEORIES OF PARTICIPATION  
 
Critics of community development blamed its failure and eventual decline on excessive 
government involvement in development programs, which created self-interested bureaucracies 
and entrenched inefficiencies; they did not empower the citizenry, to seek their views and inputs 
into the policy process at all stages. The only alternative, argued these critics, was to replace 
“production-centered” development with “people-centered” development, where ordinary people 
in general, and the poor in particular, would define the goals of development, influence the 
management of society’s resources, and determine the direction of development itself in order to 
attain “economic justice and democracy” (Robertson, 2001). The critics contended that past 
development projects failed in part because the poor, whose understanding and cooperation are 
essential for implementation, were excluded from the selection and design of such projects; thus 
alienated, they refused to collaborate with development “professionals” (Korten, 1984; Gran, 
1983; Friedmann, 1992).  Such alienation and resistance were deemed to be most prevalent in 
rural areas.   To address these problems, it was argued, the poor need to be directly involved in all 
phases of the development process, including policy formulation (Mosher, 1976; Lele, 1979; 
Montgomery, 1979). 
An alternative view of participation, based mainly on the feminist rejection of mainstream 
development theory, argued that a general and generic promotion of participation – without 
addressing the differential needs of certain social groups, particularly women, as well as unequal 
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access to power and resources – risked entrenching social and economic inequities in a male-
dominated society, irrespective of the frequency or scale of participation (Boserop, 1970; 
Molyneux, 1985; Moser, 1989). Special attention to women’s participation is crucial, according to 
this view, because in developing countries in particular they constitute the majority in economic 
activities, such as farming and trade, but receive a disproportionately small share of national 
income due to cultural and institutional impediments, such as fewer productive assets.  This state 
of affairs invariably leads to the majority of the poor in developing countries being women. Given 
the centrality of the woman/mother in the home, this has important short- and long-term 
implications for national development.  In order to reduce overall levels of poverty and promote 
national development thus required that special attention be paid to women by giving them 
greater voice in public policy and highlighting issues of particular concern to them. .  This 
emphasis on women and their participation, not just in the policy process but in development 
generally, has evolved over the years through three main perspectives: 1) Women in Development 
(WID), which advocated special attention for women in national development planning and even 
led to the creation of special ministries or departments for women’s affairs; 2) Women and 
Development (WAD), which emerged from radical feminist thought and advocated a movement 
away from the patriarchal world in which WID operated and towards a more separatist world 
where women’s contributions to development are recognized as distinctive and independent of 
“patriarchal interests;” and 3) Gender and Development (GAD), which concentrated less on the 
biological differences between the sexes and more on gender, or socially constructed, roles for 
both men and women.  To understand these roles and their differential effects on women is to be 
able to empower the powerless (i.e., women) and thus provide them with the productive resources 
to which they had hitherto not been able to have access (Parpart, 1989; Connelly, et al., 1995; 
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Rathgeber, 1990, Newland, 1991).  For GAD advocates, therefore, even within a particular 
country discrimination against women may vary according to region of residence, profession or 
ethnic group.  In promoting participation, therefore, it is important to take intra-gender and other 
social differences into consideration (Sen and Grown, 1987; Moser, 1993). 
Other critiques of mainstream participation hold that the direct involvement of “the 
masses” (whether men or women) in decision-making may not benefit them at all in the long run, 
that it might rather impede development management and hence development itself because 
“ordinary citizens lack the foresight and imagination required to plan for the future” 
(Martinussen, 1995; Connelly, 2001).  Others argue that contrary to the assumptions of people-
centered development, local populations tend to show little or no interest in their own 
development beyond that to which they are accustomed.  Such lack of interest ultimately makes 
participation an externally imposed framework not much different from state-centric development 
(Conyers, 1982; Cooke and Kothari, 2001).   
Yet other critiques of participation emphasize entrenched social interests and unequal 
power relations as undermining the putative benefits of participation.  Such critics, mostly neo-
Marxists, argue that participation at whatever level is “asymmetric,” with the result that 
“economic policies and their impact upon development patterns [are] shaped primarily by the 
most powerful classes, those with a strong organizational infrastructure and easy access to the 
state” (Martinussen, 1995: 234).  Elaborating on this view, Strinati (1995: 165) made the 
following observation:  “Dominant groups in society, including fundamentally but not exclusively 
the ruling class, maintain their dominance by securing the ‘spontaneous consent’ of subordinate 
groups, including the working class, through the negotiated construction of a political and 
ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups.” The people-
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centered perspective has also been criticized for assuming that the poor and the marginalized are a 
homogenous group, with frictionless and convergent interests (Nelson, 1989; Martinussen, 1995).  
According to Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2001: 81), “the myth of the noble peasant who 
participates based on altruistic and communitarian values, and of apolitical, egalitarian rural 
communities, died decades ago…Politics pervades human affairs at every level of 
development…[and the] poor and excluded are interest groups just like trade unions, urban elites, 
or manufacturers’ associations….” 
Another school of thought argues that problems of citizen disinterest, unequal power 
relations, and divergent interests could best be addressed through education.  According to this 
view, people have the inherent capacity to “reflect, conceptualize, and plan” and that once they 
are adequately informed or educated about the nature and benefits of projects, policies and their 
political rights and responsibilities, they would come together and advocate common, if not 
identical, positions on policies that affect them equally (Freire 1972; OECD 1995; Servaes 1995; 
Taylor, 1996; Long, 2001).   
 Another group of participation theories emphasizes not only citizen involvement in 
policy formulation but also in the monitoring and evaluation of projects or policies once they 
have been implemented or adopted (Kotz, 1981; Feuerstain, 1986; Chambers, 1997; Cousins, 
1997; Howes, 1992).  For instance, Estrella et al. (2001:3) note that “as institutions become more 
inclusive in the “front-end” of project development – that is, in promoting participation in 
appraisal and implementation – then questions of ‘who measures’ results and ‘who defines’ 
success become critical.”  While not rejecting expert evaluations outright, this perspective is 
based on the assumption that such evaluations – which tend to be distant and impersonal – can be 
enriched with the direct “testimonials” of those who ultimately matter – the citizenry.  The 
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approach, however, deals largely with “community-based initiatives” – such as rapid rural 
appraisal (RRA) and its derivative participatory rural appraisal (PRA).  Nevertheless, in it can in 
essence be extended to national level participation, as new participation advocates emphasize the 
need for citizen feedback in the formulation of all forms of national policies, such as policies on 
international trade and taxation. 
 The final group of participation theories views participation as a necessary political 
instrument for promoting economic and national development (Harbermas, 1984; Miller, 1992; 
Martinussen, 1995; Long 2001; Lisk, 1995).  These theories started originally as a response to 
the view advanced by Arrow (1963) and other others that rational decision-making by 
individuals (or “instrumental rationality”, as it is known in micro-economics) cannot reasonably 
be aggregated into the collective social decision-making implied in conventional participation 
theories. The advocates of this view (Przeworski, 1985; Dryzek, 1996) proposed 
“communicative rationality” or “deliberative democracy” as a workable alternative.  According 
to Dryzek (1996:113), the essence of deliberative democracy “is free discussion about points of 
conflict oriented to some kind of agreement, and in that discussion preferences can be changed 
and not just aggregated.”  
 The Kettering Foundation (2005: 4), a major proponent of deliberative democracy, offers 
the following rationalization for its use in policy making:   
 
  [T]o successful candidates is delegated the responsibility of administering 
management of the [country’s] resources, maintaining its security, and providing 
for every citizen’s welfare…but not even a fairly elected representative government 
can accomplish its work effectively alone….If a democratic state or community is 
to function as well as it should, then its people must continue always to share in 
addressing its problems, making judgments about how to approach them, and 
ensuring that the concerns, the needs, and rights of all groups among them are 
heard and addressed (emphasis added), Kettering Foundation  
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4. CONCEPTUALIZING THE NEW PARTICIPATION 
 
The definition of participation in economic development has evolved over the years to 
reflect changes in both the scope and dynamics of the development process itself, as indicated 
below: 
• With regard to rural development…participation includes people’s involvement in 
decision-making processes, in implementing programmes, their sharing in the benefits of 
development programmes and their involvement in efforts to evaluate such programmes 
(Cohen and Uphoff, 1977). 
• Participation is concerned with…the organized efforts to increase control over resources 
and regulative institutions in given social situations on the part of groups and movements 
of those hitherto excluded from such control (Pearse and Stifel, 1979). 
• Participation can be seen as a process of empowerment of the deprived and the excluded.  
This view is based on the recognition of differences in political and economic power 
among different social groups and classes.  Participation in this sense necessitates the 
creation of organizations of the poor which are democratic, independent and self-reliant 
(Ghai, 1990). 
• Participatory development stands for partnership which is built upon the basis of dialogue 
among the various actors, during which the agenda is jointly set and local views and 
indigenous knowledge are deliberately sought and respected.  This implies negotiation 
rather than the dominance of an externally set project agenda.  Thus people become actors 
instead of being beneficiaries (OECD, 1994). 
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• Participation is a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them (World Bank, 
1994) 
• The only way poor people can overcome their difficulties is by directly participating in the 
process of development, including formulation of social policy, development of programs, 
their implementation at the ground level, and sharing in the benefits of such programs. 
The participatory approach has the dual goal of promoting growth and equity while also 
ensuring the development of democratic processes in the grassroots (Silva and Athukorala, 
1996). 
 
The definition of Silva and Athukorala which, unlike the earlier ones, recognizes the need 
for the general public, especially the poor, to take part in the “formulation of social policy [and] 
development programs” is the closest to the meaning of “new participation” employed in this 
study.  
The new participation deals not with projects in particular areas of a country but with 
policies that are expected to affect the national economy and its sub-sectors generally. Such 
policies may be macroeconomic, made up of monetary and fiscal policies, or sectoral, dealing 
with particular sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, health or exports.  The ultimate goal 
of monetary policy, for example, is “price stability” – that is, low and stable rates of change in 
consumer prices.  A government can use any number of “policy tools,” such as interest rates, 
credit requirements for banks, money supply, and exchange rates, to attain such a goal.  Fiscal 
policy, on the other hand, deals with policies to raise revenue, finance routine government 
operations and economic development, and to manage the public debt.  Sectoral policies, as the 
 17 
                                                
name suggests, apply to particular sectors of the economy, such as agriculture or health.  
Government may elect, for instance, to introduce or remove agricultural or health subsidies with 
various consequences for the public.  It becomes imperative, under these conditions, to find ways 
of involving the public in the formulation of policies that affect these sectors.  And it is equally 
imperative that citizens desiring such participation equip themselves with the skills and 
knowledge necessary to make substantive and credible contributions to public policy. 
Because the formulation and analysis of such policies have traditionally been performed 
by specialists, such as economists, agronomists, and engineers, national-level participation is 
often conducted by proxy - with civil society groups, through their various representatives, 
contributing experiences and suggestions of their constituents to policy makers.1 Depending on 
factors such as time, financial resources, existing institutional arrangements between state and 
non-state sectors (such as capacity to communicate with others in a timely manner and procedures 
for such communication), the scope of participation, particularly at the national level, may range 
hierarchically from informational to consultational to collaborative, reflecting thedegrees of 
participatory complexity (Crosby,2000; Edgerton et al. (2000).2
 
1   (In some instances, individuals of some professional repute may contribute their expertise, in their own right, to 
policy makers at the national level). 
2   This typology is a modification of Crosby and Edgerton (2000) 
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4.1. INFORMATIONAL PARTICIPATION 
 
Information sharing in participation may involve one-way provision of information by 
government to the public or by the public to government.  At the local-level, this may entail the 
government notifying the local population of the government’s intention to initiate a particular 
project already decided upon by the government. At the national level, government may 
communicate information about policy to the public through any number of mediums. The 
provision of such information may be periodic and routine, or episodic, dictated by particular 
developments in the national economy, such as a sudden increase in world crude oil prices and the 
need to raise the officially controlled local prices of petroleum products to match the increases in 
world prices. Public provision of information to the government may take the form of responses 
to surveys or, as is commonly the case, petitions by sections of the society – such as farmers or 
exporters – who feel that existing policies are harmful to them. 
4.2. CONSULTATIVE PARTICIPATION 
 
In consultative participation, the initiator of policy or projects does not just inform the 
public but invites feedback on policies under consideration, while retaining the right to make final 
decisions on those policies; in other words, they consult the public about public policy. 
Consultative participation represents an improvement over the one-way information flow 
discussed above but is qualitatively “less” than the collaborative two-way method (discussed 
below) where all sides share in problem identification and definition, and must, together, agree on 
the final policy, program or project decisions.  Examples of consultative participation include 
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public reviews of draft legislation, government-led working groups, and government-sponsored 
planning sessions. 
4.3. COLLABORATIVE PARTICIPATION 
 
Collaborative participation involves “full” two-way information flow on socio-economic 
problems and strategies for addressing such problems over which there may be disagreements as 
to policy priorities, for example.  Collaborative participation typically takes the form of national 
conferences where policy issues are jointly chosen and discussed by representatives of the 
government and various participant groups. The end product should be a consensus document that 
enjoys legitimacy across a broad spectrum of society.  
The scope of participation in any country also depends on such factors as time, financial 
resources, technical capacity (for policy analysis in both the state and non-state sectors) and 
institutional capacity (by both the state and non-state sectors for organizing large numbers and 
diverse groups of people in a timely and coherent manner).  Hence, in a situation of severe 
balance of payments crisis, for example, where immediate government action is required, the 
best form of participation would be an informational one – where the government informs the 
public about the crisis situation, its policy options, and the expected consequences, both 
favorable and adverse.  It need not wait for any responses from the public, the only requirement 
being that the government keep the public informed so that make appropriate adjustments, 
especially where the policies would affect them directly. 
 
 
 20 
4.4. SATISFACTION FROM PARTICIPATION  
 
 Besides expectations of seeing their concerns and social issues expressed in subsequent 
policies, the psychological gratification that citizens derive from their engagement in the 
development process is considered equally important to the broader definition of development as 
attempts to meet both the material and non-material needs of a society.  Thus, in the relatively 
new field of “happiness economics”  (also known as “subjective well-being” studies), which 
draws on the literature on applied psychology (Diener, 1984; Diener, et al., 1999; Kahneman, et 
al., 1999; Argle, 2001, Di Tella, et al.), researchers are ever occupied with “non-objectivist 
theoretical analyses in economics, [based on] emotions, self-signalling (self-esteem), goal 
completion, mastery, meaning and status” (Frey and Stutzer, 2004:3).  
 Several researchers in this field (e.g., Easterlin, 1974; Oswald, 1997; Argle, 2001; 
Winkelmann, 2002) contend that the information gained from measuring such satisfaction, or the 
psychological aspects of citizen engagement in the policy process, helps, among other things, to 
formulate tax policies that better reflect the subjective concerns of citizens as well as measure 
poverty and formulate appropriate policies to deal with it. In addition to applied psychology, this 
non-objectivist approach to evaluating citizen’s satisfaction with public policy, or processes 
designed to facilitate that policy, also draws on the much-older field of customer-satisfaction 
research that started in the United States.  Though consigned to the periphery of social science in 
the United States, this type of research has gained respectability in several prominent European 
research institutions, where the effort to promote subjective indicators for public policy is 
relatively well established (Veenhoven, 2002; Klaveren and Praag, 2004) 
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In measuring successful participation, therefore, participants’ expressed satisfaction with 
specific features of a participatory forum is as important as their satisfaction with the overall 
forum or the consequences of their participation for public policy in the future. Hence, it is 
important to determine, even before they have actually participated in a forum, whether or not 
participants were satisfied with the amount of time they had to prepare for the forum. Similarly, 
in the course of a participatory forum, they may express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with how 
often they are called upon to speak, if they are called upon at all, and how much they are allowed 
to say, relative to other participants.  Such seemingly “trivial” features of participatory forums or 
episodes are in fact essential to encouraging satisfactory participation in the broader exercise of 
policy making by citizens.  
4.5. ENTRY POINTS IN PARTICIPATION 
 
Given the circular and iterative nature of the policy process, those desiring to participate 
in it must necessarily enter one or more of the various phases that comprise the process. These 
phases are: agenda setting; policy analysis and formulation; policy adoption; policy 
implementation; and policy monitoring and evaluation.  Dunn (1994) and Brinkerhoff (2001) 
illustrate the policy cycle and possible entry points for non-state actors desiring to influence 
policy.  The cycle commences with various contending social and economic issues finding their 
way, through their advocates, onto the policy agenda for debate, analysis and possible adoption, 
followed by implementation, monitoring and evaluation, as well as reformulation and/or 
termination.  This iterative, multi-faceted and multi-directional nature of the policy process 
“means that the cycle repeats itself, reflecting the fact that policies emerge, evolve, and change 
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incrementally over time, rather than making quantum leaps forward with no modification from 
their original specification” (Brinkerhoff, 2001: 12). 
Policy issues may attain agenda status exogenously or endogenously.   The former may 
be the result of donor demands (for example, demands by the IMF that utility rates be raised to 
reflect “realistic prices”) or the result of promises made during an electioneering campaign (to 
introduce, free health care, for example).  In the latter case, socio-economic issues may get on 
the policy agenda upon the recommendation of bureaucrats intimately familiar with the 
challenges of implementing particular policies, or result from evaluation findings either by social 
scientists or civil society organizations that suggest the need for some modification of existing 
policies or the formulation of new ones.   
In the subsequent phases – analysis and formulation, adoption, and implementation – 
participation is almost always limited to information sharing and consultation in the form of 
feedback from policymakers to policy advocates about their intentions and priorities.  Exceptions 
are sectoral policies, where all stakeholders (as in the case of community water and sanitation) 
may jointly examine and determine the nature of policies to be introduced. In the case of 
evaluation, as noted above, participation may range from information sharing to consultation 
(feedback to policymakers) to collaboration, where policy advocates demand that certain issues – 
such as the harmful effects of “cost sharing” in tertiary education or the impact of lower tariffs 
on local industry) be placed on the national policy agenda. 
4.6. THE PARTICIPATORY EPISODE   
 
The preceding descriptions applied to participation as a process only, but participation 
may take the form of a particular event (such as a national forum), where various stakeholders 
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converge to share their policy concerns and/or make policy demands on behalf of their 
constituencies in the expectation that those demands would be incorporated into public policy in 
the future.  For purposes of this study, such an event is referred to as the “participatory episode.”  
In a participatory episode, various stakeholders, such as civil-society organizations, government 
ministries and departments, and in some cases external creditors, make concerted efforts to bring 
together representatives of various social and economic organizations to discuss and help inform 
public policy. These episodes may occur at different times, in different parts of a country and at 
different phases of the policy process but ultimately form part of the larger and continuing 
process of participatory development. 
4.7. SUCCESSFUL PARTICIPATION DEFINED  
 
According to Brownlee-Greaves (2000: 1), “participatory theory tends to focus on the 
structure of projects or campaigns, assuming that with a sufficiently participatory framework and 
approach, the campaign will have the desired impact… A participatory structure is, in itself, not 
sufficient for success.” It is against this background that this study attempts a new approach to 
measuring the extent of success during a participatory episode by directly assessing the 
participants’ satisfaction with their involvement in the SAPRI episode.  In this regard, I propose 
the three main constituents of successful participation as inclusiveness, voice, and impact.  The 
sum effect of these indicators should give an overall idea of whether or not a participatory 
episode was deemed successful by those who took part in it, and not necessarily those who 
organized it.  “Inclusiveness” refers broadly to representativeness, as viewed by participants, in 
terms of the policy issues discussed, the various social groups represented, and the administrative 
regions of a country.  Inclusiveness, in this sense, is a necessary but by no means a sufficient 
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condition for determining successful participation; other conditions will have to be met.  “Voice” 
refers to the ability to make policy demands (or express policy concerns) by participants beyond 
fulfilling the condition of inclusiveness. Such policy demands may be made orally, in written 
form, or some combination of both.  “Impact” addresses the question:  Did participation matter?  
Or, to what extent, in participants’ views, were policy demands that were made at a forum later 
incorporated into public policy by the state? 
 At the most basic level, success at a participatory episode may be measured by the 
number of people present and, more important, the extent to which they were deemed to be 
representative of various socio- economic groups in the country. But such a definition, while 
useful as a first step in assessing the extent of participation’s success, suffers from certain 
important policy-relevant deficiencies.  It does not, for example, encompass the extent to which 
issues addressed at the forum were deemed to be reflective of the concerns of those present or 
their constituent. A high degree of social, economic and issues representativeness is therefore 
needed in order to be able to speak of successful participation. Together, these three factors – 
social, economic and issues representativeness – constitute the “inclusiveness” in successful 
participation.   
But inclusiveness alone does not, for the purposes of this study at least, address the issue 
of actual presentations of various policy demands at the forum.  Was everybody given adequate 
opportunity to make their policy demands or was the process dominated by a few vocal and 
perhaps better-resourced participants? The attempt to measure this phenomenon leads us to a 
second critical dimension of successful participation:  voice.  Together, inclusiveness and voice 
will constitute the measures of intra-episode success of participation from the viewpoints of the 
participants, not their organizations. 
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Finally, beyond the measurement of inclusiveness and voice, it is important to establish 
the extent to which participants believe that public policy developed after SAPRI reflects the 
demands that they made at the forum.  This would be a post-episode measure of successful 
participation and it is designated as impact. 
The extensive, sometimes even confusing, literature on the meaning of “impact” in 
policy-evaluation studies (Holland, 1993; Weiss, 1997; Roche, 1999; McGee, 2001), however, 
requires some elaboration for the benefit of this study. Booth and Lucas (2002) discuss the 
different uses of the words impact, outcomes and outputs among various development agencies 
and practitioners. Citing the Developments Assistance Committee (DAC) and monitoring and 
evaluation researchers, they point out the use of the term “outcomes” to mean “specific results 
and the utilisation of means/services by beneficiaries,” in contrast to “movements in measures 
poverty,” which are referred to as “impacts” Booth and Lucas, 2002: 6). However, after noting 
that it is conventional “in the broader social science fields concerned with poverty-reduction 
strategies and poverty information…to speak of the final goal of policy as to influence poverty 
outcomes, or outcomes for the poor,” they make the following observation:  “There is also an 
understandable tendency to associate the word ‘impact’ with the activity of evaluation, implying 
that an impact is not just a final result but one that can be attributed to a specific intervention.” 
(ibid). 
Until there is some global convention on the harmonized use of these important but 
needlessly confusing terms, each author, it seems, is left to spell out what he means by each in 
order to avoid more confusion.  In this study, “impact” is used as an umbrella term comprising 
outputs and outcomes, both reflecting to various degrees the consequences of some policy 
initiative, or inputs. These inputs may result from citizen advocacy, such as SAPRI, or 
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recommendations from professional policy analysis.  Inputs (such as education expenditures) 
may produce outputs (such as school buildings, new teachers, school meals, teaching materials, 
or in the case of northern Ghana, bicycles for students who live long distances from their 
schools). However, the outcome (i.e., the direct and sometimes indirect difference that those 
inputs make in people’s lives) would depend on the specific objectives of the policy concerned:  
Was it intended to reduce the dropout rate among pupils? Or improve their reading scores? Or 
better yet help reduce poverty in a particular community?  If the objective is to reduce the 
dropout rate, for example, the outcome is likely to be reflected in the short- to medium-terms.  If 
the objective was poverty reduction, it would take much longer, as pupils move through the 
educational system, acquire employable skills, enter the labor market, find employment, and 
hopefully begin to earn enough to afford, at the minimum, the basic necessities of life.  
Depending on context, outputs (such as new teachers employed as a result of increased 
budgetary allocations) may become inputs (when these teachers then begin to impart their 
knowledge on their students for their eventual entry into the labor force).  In this study, “impact”, 
is the aggregation of both of these consequences (outputs and outcomes) of public policy as 
viewed by the respondent.  Hence, a respondent who feels that the dropout rate in his or her 
hometown has gone down as a result of SAPRI may implicitly be looking at outputs or outcomes 
or some combination of the two, depending on the initial conditions of education in that 
hometown and what they expected public policy to do about it.  
4.8. HOW EXTERNAL KNOWLEDGE INFLUENCES PUBLIC POLICY 
 
Since the 1970s when social researchers discovered that “policy makers seldom used 
knowledge gained through social research,” the determinants of knowledge utilization in public 
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policy has occupied the minds of many a researcher (Nielson, 2001). Among the most common 
explanations of knowledge utilization in public policy are theories of the “two communities” (or 
“cultural gap”) of researchers and policy makers (Caplan, 1979; Booth, 1988) and the 
“enlightenment function” of policy-relevant knowledge (Weiss, 1977).   
 Different conceptions of the relevance of the policy-relevant knowledge between the 
generator of that knowledge and the policy makers has been cited as a major reason why such 
knowledge may not find its way into public policy.  “There is considerable difference between 
what scientists and policy makers consider to be knowledge, as well as the difference between 
how that knowledge was developed or obtained. Social scientists generally see knowledge as 
something that is theoretically and methodologically sound…Policy makers see knowledge as 
something that comes from experience [and common sense] (Nielson, 2001:6; Booth, 1988: 
226).  
 Weiss (1977: 533) emphasizes “conflicting demands on policy makers and disjunctions 
between the knowledge needs of policymakers and the research outputs of social scientists.”  She 
adds: 
On the research side, much of what goes by the name of social science 
knowledge is flawed, inconclusive, ambiguous, and contradicted by evidence 
from other studies…On the policy side, there are a host of competing claims 
for attention.  The policymaking process is a political process, with the basic 
aim of reconciling interests in order to negotiate a consensus, not 
implementing logic and truth (ibid). 
 
Even more important than the motives of the two communities is the nature of utilization, 
the definition of which has relevance for developing countries like Ghana and the phenomenon 
of SAPRI.  Caplan (1979:  462-464) distinguishes between instrumental use, which involves 
day-to-day “administrative policy issues of limited significance…pertaining to bureaucratic 
management and efficiency rather than substantive public policy issues” and conceptual use 
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which entails the “gradual shift of policy makers’ awareness and re-orientation of their basic 
perspectives.”  He adds that conceptual use of policy relevant knowledge comprises “important 
policy matters which affect the nation as a whole” and is always undertaken in the context of 
“macro-level decisions.”  These are decisions that, so to speak, lead to a sea change not only in 
the content of public policy but also in the general philosophical direction of governance.  The 
retrenchment of state role in the economy, for example, in favor of markets and private 
enterprise is illustrative of this view. 
Closely associated with the preceding discussion is the realization that problem solving 
does not constitute “the most prevalent use of social research but that the use of research is 
actually much more diffuse and indirect” (Nielson, 2001: 9).  According to Weiss (1979:531; 
emphasis added), “government decision makers tend to use research indirectly, as sources of 
ideas, information, and orientation to the world.  Although the process is not easily discernable, 
over time it may have profound effects on policy.”  To increase the chances of having their 
research influence policy, other researchers have suggested the adoption of participatory 
research, which incorporates “all relevant stakeholders into the research process, including both 
researchers and policy makers”. (Nielson, 2001: 7).  Bernard and Wind (1998) concede that 
while such an approach may not guarantee the utilization of researcher-generated knowledge by 
policy makers it may help bring the “two communities” closer. 
4.9. WHO QUALIFIES TO PARTICIPATE?  
 
Irrespective of the nature and motivations of participation, there is always the question of 
who selects the participants.  According to Brinkerhoff (2001:3), answering this question 
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requires a look at the “contextual factors relating to the political system, governance [and] social 
relations,” among other factors. 
In the literature on policy formation, these contextual factors appear under two broad 
approaches:  state-centered and society-centered (Grindle and Thomas, 1991).  The state-
centered approach encompasses several models, such as the rational actor model and the 
bureaucratic politics model (Robinson and Majak, 1967; Allison, 1971; Frohock, 1979).  
However, the model of the greatest relevance to participatory development is the corporatist 
model, because it represents an interface between the state and society against a background of 
unequal resource endowments. 
According to Staniland (1985: 73), corporatist regimes tend to have “procedures for 
consultation with the larger business, financial, and labor organizations, and such procedures 
have the effect of excluding from real political influence individuals and groups unfortunate 
enough not to have been co-opted” by the state. Schmitter (1974) and Staniland (1985), however, 
make a distinction between “societal corporatism,” common in Europe, and “state corporatism”, 
found in states with “delayed capitalist development” (Staniland, 1985: 75).  In the former, 
relations between the state and non-state organizations are said to be “partial and reciprocal,” 
while under the latter, “the initiative and the locus of control [are] heavily on the side of the 
state” (Staniland, 1985: 74). Under such conditions, exercises in participatory development can 
become a pretext for the state to co-opt non-state actors by, for example, granting favors to some 
groups while restricting privileges to others (Foweraker, 1995; 2000; Diamond, 1999; Trip, 
2001). 
Under the society-centered approach, there is less emphasis on co-optation, and public 
policy is said to be determined either by class interests, or through a plurality of social groups 
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pursuing the common or aggregated interests of their members (Truman, 1951; Dahl, 1961, 
1971).  “For some pluralists, the state is a more or less neutral arena for conflicting and 
competing interests to shape policy output, and no groups are systematically discriminated 
against in their access to power” (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 23).  With the state acting as a 
disinterested arbiter of competing social interests, according to this view, the risk of cooptation is 
essentially non-existent.  In fact, the various interest groups are said to enjoy a “relative power in 
bargaining, negotiating, marshalling votes, and otherwise influencing policy makers” (ibid). 
4.10. PROPOSITIONS OF THE STUDY   
 
In line with the preceding discussion, it is hypothesized here that successful participation 
at a national forum (measured by the various degrees of inclusiveness, voice, and impact) will be 
higher,   
1. the greater the level of participants’ economic literacy, 
2. the more favorable participants’ assessments of their organizations’ analytical capacity, 
and 
3. the greater the process is deemed to be facilitative of participants’ contributions. 
 
The concepts in the above propositions, along with other factors of plausible explanatory 
importance, are measured through a survey questionnaire.   Based on the results of the survey, 
indices or scales of successful participation, as well as their plausible determinants, are 
constructed for the analysis and interpretation of the various relationships between the various 
variables. 
 31 
In summary, it must be stated that successful participation in policy making is a complex 
and multi-faceted phenomenon that cannot simply be measured by the number of people present 
at a forum but through the individual and combined evaluation of such factors as inclusiveness 
(of groups, issues, and administrative regions), voice (of the participants), and impact (of 
participants’ demands on public policy).  Inclusiveness and voice are used to measure intra-
episode success (that is, success within the participatory episode, or SAPRI, as judged by the 
participants themselves), while impact measures the effects of participation after the 
participatory episode is over, also as judged by the participants.  Determining who participates is 
equally important because of the likelihood of the state co-opting civil society groups and thus 
undermining the substantive and democratic relevance of participation. There are instances, 
however, where the state could act as a ‘disinterested arbiter of competing social interests” and 
ensure that in the long run the common interests are served. 
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5. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
5.1. PRELUDE TO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT  
 
 Between the year of independence, 1957, and the mid-1960s, Ghana had one of the 
strongest economies in Africa (Norman, 1970; Franco, 1979; Huq, 1989; Rimmer, 1992; Roe, 
1992; Leechor, 1994; Werlin, 1994).  However, a collapse in the world prices of cocoa, the 
country’s main foreign exchange earner, at the beginning of the 1960s put a strain on the 
economy.  A military coup in 1966, followed briefly by a two-year market-oriented civilian 
government, succeeded in restoring the economy to partial health. 
Another military coup in 1972 only succeeded in ushering in a decade of widespread 
economic mismanagement at the hands of a “vampire elite” principally made up of military 
officers (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). In 1975, for instance, the economy contracted by an inflation-
adjusted rate of 12.4 percent, followed by a further decline of 3.5 percent in 1976.  This was 
followed by erratic growth rates of (positive) 8.5 percent in 1978, for instance, and then another 
decline of 2.5 percent the following year.  In 1981 and 1982, even with the advent of structural 
adjustment, the economy continued on its downward slide and posted negative growth rates of 
3.5 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively (see Figure 5.1).  The production of cocoa, long the 
lifeblood of the economy, also fell markedly, from 427,000 metric tons in 1970, for example, to 
179,000 metric tons in the 1982/83 season.  Both exports and imports, as a share of GDP, fell 
from 19.3 percent and 16.9 percent, respectively, in 1970 to 15.0 percent and 14.6 percent.  
Along with the fall in exports came a decline in the country’s international monetary reserves, 
essential for the importation of goods and services.  Reserves declined from US$271.1 million in 
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1979, for instance, to US$138.7 million, worsening an existing shortage of essential commodities 
like milk, soap and cooking oil (see Figures 5.2 to 5.4). 
In addition to the collapse in production, a combination of institutional rigidities and 
natural disasters, such as a drought and bush fires, combined to create some of the highest 
inflation rates in the country’s history.  The consumer inflation rate, which had reached a 
historical high of 120 percent in 1977, fluctuated at or above 50.0 percent and reached 114.9 
percent before falling steeply to 22.5 percent in 1982 (See Figure 5.5).  By 1983, when structural 
adjustment was launched, the inflation rate had climbed back to a news record:  123.0 percent. 
As to be expected, the general decay of the macro-economy translated into a severe and 
steady deterioration in the living standards of Ghanaians.  The social sector, especially health and 
education, as well as the micro-economy, were particularly affected through rising 
unemployment and stagnant wages (Riddell, 1992; Tarp, 1993; Schatz, 1994; ODI, 1996; UNDP, 
1997).  In 1983, with the assistance of the World Bank and other international financial 
organizations, a new military government that had seized power a year earlier, launched the 
structural adjustment program. 
Figure 5-1 Pre-SAP Economic Growth (Annual % Change in Real GDP) 
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Figure 5-2  Pre-Structural Adjustment Cocoa Production  (In ‘000 MTs) 
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Figure 5-3  Pre-Structural Adjustment Exports and Imports   (% Share of GDP) 
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Figure 5-4  Pre-structural Adjustment International Reserves (In US$mil.) 
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Figure 5-5Pre-Structural Adjustment Inflation Rate  (Annual % Change) 
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5.2. GHANA UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
 
The structural adjustment program initiated by the government was implemented in three 
major and overlapping phases: (i) stabilization, (ii) rehabilitation, and (iii) liberalization and 
growth (Mosley, 1995; Helleiner, 1993; IMF, 1996). In the first phase, the government focused 
on stabilizing the macro-economy by, among other things, raising interest rates, cutting 
government spending, devaluing the national currency, and dismantling the country’s 
complicated and cumbersome system of price controls.  In the second phase, emphasis was 
placed on improving utilization and greater efficiency in the use of existing resources. Finally, in 
the liberalization and growth phase, policy focused on the revision of existing laws to stimulate 
investments, particularly foreign investment (World Bank, 1984; Green, 1987; Olukoshi, 1994).  
The program was almost entirely economic in orientation and therefore paid little or no attention 
to social issues, such education, health, and especially the poverty implications of structural 
adjustment for vulnerable groups like women and children. 
In the years that followed the launching of structural adjustment, the macro-economy did 
in fact show considerable improvement in its key indicators, compared to the near-collapse of the 
economy in the decade prior to the program (see Figures 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10). In 1984, 
aided by good weather and bumper harvests, the agriculture-dominated Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) grew by a staggering 8.8 percent in inflation-adjusted terms. Other sectors, notably 
mining, manufacturing, services, and especially the cocoa sub-sector of agriculture, also showed 
signs of dramatic improvements.  Cocoa production, for instance, rose from 159,000 tons in the 
1983/84 season to 300,000 by 1989 and increasing further to 409,000 by the time SAPRI was 
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launched (World Bank, 1994; World Bank, 1995).  With the rehabilitation of the once moribund 
industrial and agricultural sectors, the share of exports in GDP also rose from 10.8 percent in 
1983 to 37.3 in 2000. In terms of macro-economic stability, inflation, which was 123 percent in 
1983, tumbled down to about 40 percent the following year and then followed a generally 
downward trend thereafter, reaching a low of 10 percent in 1992 (Kapur, 1991; Loxley, 1991; 
Killick, 1993).  The level of international reserves also recovered, from US$142.6 million in 
1983 to US$511.00 by 1986.  In 1986, it reached a-then record of US$738.4 million.  In the 
subsequent years, overall economic growth remained positive, though somewhat lower than the 
initial burst of high growth rates that followed the initiation of structural adjustment (Rothchild, 
1991; ODI, 1996; Sowa, 1994). 
Figure 5-6  Economic Growth Under Structural Adjustment (Annual % Change) 
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Figure 5-7  Cocoa Production Under Structural Adjustment   (In '000 MTs) 
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Figure 5-8  Inflation Under Structural Adjustment (Annual % Change) 
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Figure 5-9   International Reserves Under Structural Adjustment (US$ Mil.) 
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Figure 5-10  Exports-Imports Share of GDP Under Structural Adjustment (In Percent) 
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5.3. BACKLASH AGAINST STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
 
But there was also an unseemly side to the good macro-economic news of structural 
adjustment.  Successful attempts at downsizing an admittedly bloated government bureaucracy 
through the retrenchment of workers led to widespread unemployment and under-employment, 
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particularly for those who found themselves in economically less rewarding activities, such as 
petty trading (Boateng and Fine, 2000; Logan, 1993; Summers, 1993; Stewart, 1995; Lynne, 
1996).  Public sector employment, which stood at 395,000 in 1985, began to decline steadily, 
until it reached 143,000 in 1996.  Initially, the formal private sector appeared to have absorbed 
some of the retrenched workers, as its ranks swelled from 60,000 in 1985 to 85,000 in 1987.  
Thereafter, perhaps as a result of the cooling off from the initial burst of growth, employment in 
the formal private sector also began to decline, reaching a low of 21,000 by 1996 (see Table 5.1 
below). The end result of these developments was a steep rise in the number of self-employed 
petty traders, selling anything from single units of chewing gum to dog chains along the streets 
of the country’s major cities and towns. 
Over the same period, the precipitous fall in the rate of inflation translated into a rise in 
real earnings by about 40.0 percent between 1984 and 1990 (Boateng and Fine, 2000), but this 
seemingly impressive growth in earnings occurred against a background of a 20.0 percent fall in 
real earnings between 1960 and 1984 in the formal sector.  For the vast majority of workers 
outside the formal sector, real earnings appeared to have stagnated or perhaps even declined 
further, because although the inflation rate had declined from a high of 123.0 percent in 1983 to 
as low as 10.4 percent by 1985, the rate soon climbed up again, reaching 39.8 percent in 1987 
and, after several years of uneven growth, reached a high of 59.6 percent in 1995 (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2000). 
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Table  5-1 Formal Sector Employment Under SAP.Adjustment (1982-1996) 
  Total Public Private 
1982 290 240 50 
1983 320 250 70 
1984 450 390 60 
1985 455 395 60 
1986 405 320 85 
1987 385 300 85 
1988 300 250 50 
1989 215 190 25 
1990 220 195 25 
1991 190 160 30 
1992 185 156 28 
1993 179 153 26 
1994 174 150 25 
1995 169 146 23 
1996 165 143 21 
Source:  Ghana Statistical Service 
 
Predictably, critics, mostly academics and the very vocal labor movement, dismissed the 
“miracle” of economic recovery under structural adjustment as one of “job- less growth” and 
called for more aggressive government action to ameliorate the worsening social situation in the 
country.   As a response, the government in 1988 initiated the Programme of Actions to Mitigate 
the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD).  Among other things, PAMSCAD was to promote 
labor-intensive development projects in the rural areas and help individuals establish viable 
small-scale businesses.  However, poor project design and lack of adequate funding from both 
the Ghanaian government and foreign sources severely hampered the implementation of the 
various policies and projects under the program (Jonah, 1989; Summers and Pritchett, 1993; 
European Commission, 1995; Karnik, 1996; UNDP, 1997; Aryeetey, 2000; Weissman, 1990 ). 
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Beyond the problem of rising unemployment and stagnating wages, civil society 
organizations also pointed out the decline in key social sectors, such as education and health, and 
an overall increase in poverty, particularly among women and children.     Along with high 
dropout rates, schools across the country had also experienced steep falls in enrolment rates due 
to cut backs in education expenditures and the introduction of “cost recovery” measures that 
charged for some educational services that had previously been offered for free by the state 
(Abugre, 2001; Harrigan and Younger, 2000; Britwum, et al., 2001). 
A study of the distribution of social spending (World Bank, 1995a), for example, found 
that between 1989 and 1992, the share of total education spending going to the poorest 20 
percent of Ghanaians had fallen from 17.0 percent to 16.0 percent, while that of health had also 
fallen from 12.0 percent to 11.0 percent. For the richest 20.0 percent, the fall in education 
spending was from 24.1 percent to 21. However, for the same category of Ghanaians, the share 
of health sector spending rose from 31.0 percent to 34.0 percent.  Among factors responsible for 
this state of affairs was “urban bias” in public expenditures as well as “leakages” in disbursement 
of funds from the central government to the regions and districts.  Another World Bank study 
found that only “20 percent of non-wage public health expenditures and 50 percent of non-wage 
education expenditures” reached their beneficiary organizations in the regions and districts. 
(Canagarjah, 2002). 
In the health sector, other developments arising from structural adjustment proved to be 
detrimental to many Ghanaians.  The imposition of user fees ostensibly to finance the 
procurement of equipment and logistics led to reduced access to health services among the poor, 
according to the Ghana Statistical Service.  Overall, outpatient attendance was estimated to have 
fallen by as much as 33 percent during the period of structural adjustment; in the rural areas, the 
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rate was said to be higher (Abugre, 2001; Cornia, 1987; Boachie-Danquah, 1992; Adepoju, 
1993; Alexander, 1991; Donkor, 1997). Whatever gains in health care had been achieved during 
the period, such as reductions in the incidence of river blindness and polio, were attributed to 
programs by the United Nations carried out outside the scope of the structural adjustment 
program. 
The overall incidence of poverty in the country also increased dramatically during the 
1980s and 1990s, as reported in the Ghana Living Standards Surveys in 1988, 1989, 1992 and 
1999.  Methodological differences in survey design, however, made it impossible to compare 
poverty rates over years. These limitations were addressed in 1997 and 2000 by researchers 
(Memery and Mehra, 1997; Ghana Statistical Service, 2000).  Table 5.2 shows the original and 
revised estimates of poverty in1988, 1989, and 1992.  The direction of change in the poverty rate 
remained the same even after the revisions, but there were substantial changes in the magnitude 
of the rates.  Originally, the proportion of the national population living in poverty was reported 
to have risen from 36.9 percent in 1988 to 41.8 percent in 1989 before falling to 31.4 percent in 
1992.  The revised data, however, showed an increase from 26.1 percent to 31.9 percent followed 
by a decline to 27.4 percent in each of the corresponding periods. Indeed, in the foreword to the 
Ghana Human Development Report in 1997, the then minister of finance acknowledged that 
“recent studies…have raised worrying questions about the extent and distribution of poverty as 
well as the impact of the Economic Recovery Programme on vulnerable groups, particularly in 
rural areas” (UNDP, 1999: i).  Such admissions provided fuel for those who considered structural 
adjustment a failure and demanded a civil society audit of it. 
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Table 5-2  Poverty Rates Under Structural Adjustment 
 Previous Estimate Revised Estimates 
 1988 1989 1992 1988 1989 1992 
Accra 8.5 21.9 23.0 5.5 13.6 20.2 
Other Urban 33.4 35.1 27.7 23.0 24.4 21.0 
Rural Coastal 37.7 44.6 28.6 26.8 32.9 22.3 
Rural Forest 38.1 41.9 33.0 21.5 28.1 23.3 
Rural Savannah 49.4 54.8 38.3 42.9 51.6 45.0 
National 36.9 41.8 31.4 26.1 31.9 27.4 
Source: Demery and Mehra (1995), quoted in Aryeetey (2000)  
 
Not surprisingly, the poverty studies showed significant variations across the country’s 
10 administrative regions of the country and among various socio-economic groups, particularly 
women and children.  For example, all but three of the regions – Central, Northern, and Upper 
East, – recorded varying degrees of reduction in poverty rates, with Greater Accra (home to the 
administrative and economic capital of the country) posting the steepest drop of 80.8 percent:  
From 26.0 percent in 1991-1991 to 5.0 percent in 1998-1999.  In the Central Region, the 
proportion of people living in poverty was reported to have increased by 9.1 percent (from 44.0 
percent in 1991-1992 to 48.0 percent in 1998-1999); in the Northern Region, the rate reportedly 
increased by 9.5 percent (from 63.0 percent to 69.0 percent); while the Upper East was said to 
have recorded the largest increase of 31.3 percent (from 67.0 percent to 88.0 percent. 
The poverty status of women and children during this period also worsened (Appiah, et 
al. 2000;  Bortei-Doku-Aryeetey-, 2000). Female-headed households, they found, tended to have 
a higher incidence of poverty than households of similar size that were headed by men. The 
relationship between poverty, childhood and area of residence was aptly described by Appiah, et 
al. (2000) as follows: 
 The children of poor Ghanaian households are less likely to be currently 
attending school than their non-poor Ghanaian counterparts, though the area 
of residence has a more important impact than poverty per se.  The net 
primary enrollment rates for the non-poor in Savannah [found in the three 
 45 
northern regions of the country] – at 59.0 percent for boys and 46.0 percent 
for girls – are markedly lower than those of the poor in Accra (87.0 percent 
and 78.0 percent), respectively.  Although poverty clearly reduces the 
likelihood of school attendance, area of residence appears to be as 
important, if not more so.  Similar considerations apply to secondary 
[school] enrolments. 
 
 
These revelations influenced the agitation for civil society involvement in policy making.  
SAPRI was conceived and initiated in response to these calls. 
In summary, the structural adjustment program launched by the Ghanaian government in 
the early 1980s helped to stabilize the economy and turn around growth from negative to 
positive.  However, the extent of recovery turned out to be less than adequate, as economic 
growth soon stagnated.  At the same time, the adverse effects of some of the policies of 
stabilization, such as reductions in health and education spending, began to show in social 
statistics, such as rising poverty among women and increases in mortality and morbidity rates.  
Not even PAMSCAD could reverse the situation and eventually the government bowed to 
domestic and international pressure to review the nature and effects of structural adjustment and 
draw upon the lessons learned to formulate future policies. 
 
6. EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF SAPRI 
 
Beginning in the early 1990s, a loose network of civil society organizations around 
the world intensified their criticism of structural adjustment programs and called for a civil 
society-led evaluation of the various structural adjustment programs as a first step towards 
charting a new course for policies that would prove less socially harmful. The justification 
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for placing civil society organizations at the forefront of the review was captured in the 
following statement by a spokesperson of one of the civil society organizations: 
SAPRI represents an opportunity to build civil society alliances, to 
engage with governments in a development process, and at the same 
time to confront an extremely changed and competitive 
world…Weakened states and weakened civil societies need to work 
together on a systematic basis in order to do better...Moving forward 
collectively will make it possible for all parties to recognize their 
strengths and weaknesses, and to see how the costs and benefits of 
economic reforms may be shared.3
 
  As agitation by civil society organizations mounted, the then president of the World Bank 
challenged them to put forward a framework for a joint Bank-civil society-state evaluation of 
structural adjustment. In response, the civil society organizations proposed the Structural 
Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) initially for a handful of countries.  Ghana 
was one of eight countries so chosen to participate in the exercise. Within the conceptual 
framework of participation, SAPRI occurred within the evaluative phase of the policy cycle, thus 
affording participants the opportunity to assess a program that has already been implemented 
without adequate civil society involvement to help shape the future direction of policy on the 
basis of what is learned from such an assessment. 
6.1. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL ENGAGEMENT  
 
 The political environment within which SAPRI took place was markedly different from 
what prevailed in 1983 and the decade afterwards, when structural adjustment was implemented.  
Back then, the country was under a military dictatorship that tolerated no dissent. Many critics of 
government policy were either incarcerated or had to go into external exile; there simply was no 
 
3   Abugre, Charles, Third World Network, “Why SAPRI is Important in Africa”, 
www.worldbank.org/research/sapri/ghana/ghanafgf.htm 
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room for civil society to engage the technocratic elite of domestic politicians and international 
bureaucrats who crafted their policies on unverified assumptions and expected those policies to 
benefit the society equitably, irrespective of one’s socio-economic status. 
 The global criticism of SAPs as a failed development framework, driven by a policy 
oligarchy of local and foreign technocrats, coincided with Ghana’s return to civilian multi-party 
rule in 1993 and rising calls for civic engagement in public policy.  Article 35 of the 1992 
constitution that ushered in civilian rule provided legitimacy for those calls by enjoining the state 
(made of up government, parliament, and other public institutions) to provide “all possible 
opportunities to the people to participate in decision making at every level of national life and in 
government.”  A major assumption behind this constitutional provision was that even after “the 
people” select representatives from their ranks to manage national affairs for them, it is crucial 
that they “police” those representatives by actively participating in the formulation and 
implementation of public policy. In other words, the real business of democracy took place not 
during elections but between them, with civil society playing a central and catalytic role. 
6.2. ORGANIZING SAPRI IN GHANA 
 
  In preparing for SAPRI,4 organizers addressed two major and inter-related tasks:  (1) 
ensuring that the initiative was not the “thin edge of co-optation of [civil society organizations] 
by the Government-[World] Bank alliance” and (2) stimulating public interest in an issue which 
the government and its external financiers had dominated for nearly two decades without civil-
society involvement.5
 
4   Unless otherwise stated, the term SAPRI henceforth refers to the exercise in Ghana only. 
5   This section is based on “The SAPRI: Organizing Civil Society to Review Structural Adjustment Policies,” 
www.undp.org/tcdc/bestprac/social/cases/1-sapri.htm. 
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  Unlike corporatist participatory exercises elsewhere (such as Ireland and Latin America), 
where the state selects participants, the composition of SAPRI’s participants was determined by 
the civil society organizations themselves through a process that sometimes proved contentious.   
Under the direction of a Provisional Working Group (PROWOG), two civil society groups – 
Third World Network and Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC) -- initiated steps to 
bring together other civil society groups that would be geographically representative and 
reflective of all key areas of civil society organizations in terms of gender and development 
activities. The efforts of the PROWOG culminated in a 25-member Civil Society Coordinating 
Council (CivisoC) distributed as follows, after much bargaining between civil society 
organizations (without any state or World Bank involvement): 
• Labor, represented by the Trades Union Congress:  2 seats 
• Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT):  2 seats 
• University Teachers Association of Ghana:   1 seat 
• Polytechnic Teachers Association of Ghana:  1 seat 
• Association of Small Industries:    1 seat 
• Association of Ghana Industry   2 seat 
• Ghana Association of Farmers and Fishermen:  2 seats 
• Women’s organizations    2 seats 
• International NGOs based in Ghana:    1 seat 
• Local NGOs:      1 seat 
• Environmental NGOs:    1 seat 
• Religious organizations:    2 seat 
 49 
  In addition to the above, the country’s 10 administrative regions were grouped into six 
zones and assigned a place each on Civisoc.  The only exception was the northern zone, 
comprising the three poorest regions in the country, which was given two seats.   
  Once its membership was in place, the Council set about the next task of mobilizing and 
organizing Ghanaian civil society through various national outreach conferences.  It was at these 
conferences that participants determined the agenda of SAPRI as it was to be held.  According to 
the United Nations Development Program, “organizations which normally would not have access 
to or be involved in a national advocacy exercise were drawn in, and lower officials and 
functionaries of some  [organizations of civil society] …became involved in ways that were not 
the norm in such institutions (ibid).”  Moreover, the evaluation report of SAPRI-Ghana by the 
United Nations noted the following:   
 
Prior to SAPRI, the working relations between the NGO 
community and the labour movement were weak.  At least three 
factors account for this.  The two types of organisations had tended 
to operate in different channels and generally did not see each 
other as different branches of a generic entity, i.e., organisations of 
civil society.  Secondly, NGOs perceived the labour movement as 
“political” precisely because of its regular disagreements with 
governments over the socio-economic implications of development 
policy choices such as the SAP.  Thirdly, this NGO perception of 
the labour movement as tending to “take on the government” was 
complemented by inadequate understanding of NGOs within the 
labour movement. 
 
 
  While civil society groups worked autonomously to create the agenda for SAPRI, they 
nevertheless coordinated most of their activities with the Ghanaian government and the World 
Bank, the country’s single largest creditor.  In all of these interactions, the government initially 
appeared to be more of a reluctant participant than an organization inclined to co-opt SAPRI, as 
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some critics of the exercise had feared.  Eventually, upon the persuasion of civil society 
organizations, both the government and parliament took active and enthusiastic part in SAPRI, 
pledging to abide by the findings and decisions of the forum.  Similarly, the World Bank, whose 
role was to help facilitate SAPRI by, among other things, ensuring that they used methodologies 
that would be comparable across the participating countries, was represented at various SAPRI 
events by an officer in charge of NGO affairs.  To preserve their independence and further avoid 
the risk of co-optation by the Bank, in particular, the civil society groups also insisted on 
sourcing their own funding for the exercise. 
  On November 25, 1997, SAPRI-Ghana was launched in Accra, the national capital, 
followed by two national forums, one in November 1998 and the other in May 2001. 
Significantly, on the eve of the final forum, the World Bank’s Vice President for Development 
Policy, Jo Ritzen, in meetings with various civil society organizations involved in SAPRI-Ghana 
noted:  “The experiences of people are crucial to the development process.”  In terms of entry 
points, SAPRI was situated within the evaluation phase of the policy cycle, with the potential for 
participants to provide information to policy makers (agenda setting) for the next generation of 
policy making dealing with issues discussed at the Forum. 
  In summary, despite initial resistance from the World Bank and to a limited extent the 
Ghanaian government, civil society organizations in Ghana (and elsewhere) managed to organize 
a joint evaluation, involving civil society, the World Bank and the government of Ghana, of 
Ghana’s experiences with structural adjustment over nearly two decades.  This was the first 
major collaboration between the labor movement and other civil society groups in Ghana, due to 
previous mutual suspicions and misunderstanding over their roles in the development process.  
To ensure that the civil society organizations involved in the exercise were not co-opted, the 
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organizers went out of their way to secure their own funding, independent of the World Bank 
and the Ghanaian government.  Finally, SAPRI was launched in 1997 and the final forum was 
held in May 2001 in Accra, Ghana. 
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7. STUDY DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
7.1. DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
 
As noted previously, some studies of SAPRI-Ghana have already been undertaken, and 
these studies have emphasized how organizers overcame various institutional and organizational 
obstacles in order to host the exercise.  From this general point of view, SAPRI-Ghana was a 
resounding success.  But “success” according to whom, the organizers or the participants?  The 
extant evaluations have only dealt with the former; this study proposes to look as success of 
SAPRI-Ghana through the eyes of the individual participants. In this regard we will focus on the 
three main components of successful participation discussed earlier – inclusiveness, voice, and 
impact.  
Once we have established and carefully delineated these components, we then move on to 
evaluate the success of SAPRI, as viewed by the participants, by determining factors and 
characteristics that may be statistically associated with success as deemed by the participants 
themselves.  Success, in this sense, would be of two kinds: intra-episode success, which 
determines how effective the actual participatory exercise was, and post-episode success, which 
measures participants views of the impact of their participation on public policy following 
SAPRI.   Specifically, beyond the main components of successful participation, we are interested 
in characteristics such as the economic literacy of the participants; their views on the analytical 
capacity of their various organizations; and what they thought of the SAPRI process (whether 
they believed it facilitated or impeded their participation).  Other variables, such as the education 
level of participants, their sex, and their region of residence, will be evaluated on their own and 
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as controls in order to strengthen the assessment of the postulated relationships between the 
various facets of successful participation (the dependent variables) and factors associated with 
those variables (the independent variables). 
Economic literacy will measure the extent of participants’ self-rated knowledge of the 
kinds of economic issues that dominate public policy generally and structural adjustment 
programs in particular.  A policy analytic capacity index will measure the extent to which 
participants find their organizations to be technically or professionally capable of providing them 
with the kind of policy analysis they need to participate effectively in a forum like SAPRI.  
Finally, since participants can have high degrees of economic literacy and be backed by high 
analytic capabilities of their organizations, but still not be able to make policy demands at public 
forum, their assessment of the process of participation (both before and during the review 
exercise) is also measured. Each of these variables, like those of successful participation, is 
operationalized and measured on an ordinal scale. 
7.2. DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION PROCEDURES  
 
  The data for the study were obtained through a survey of SAPRI participants across 
Ghana. The initial list of participants, obtained from the global SAPRI Network, was 240 
persons.6 The list was reviewed for useability, in terms of such factors as valid names, addresses, 
telephone numbers, and e-mail addresses.  Based on these criteria, 156 potential respondents 
were identified as valid for the purposes of this study. A pilot questionnaire was sent out to 16 of 
these identified respondents. They were encouraged to complete the questionnaire and return 
them with comments of any kind, such as comprehensibility of the questions and issues that they 
 
6  The Institutional Review Board of the University of Pittsburgh granted approval for the study on December 6, 
2002.  The approval is attached as Appendix C. 
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would like to see covered in the study.  Eleven people responded, eight of whom added 
comments for improvements.  Based on this feedback and the author’s further reviews, the 
questionnaire was revised and reprinted for the actual study (see Appendix A). 
Copies of the revised questionnaire were mailed out to the remaining 140 
respondents.  Out of this number, an initial 73 responded over a four-week period, with some 
making additional comments not on the questionnaire’s content but about SAPRI itself. Of 
the73 initial responses, eight were found to be missing significant amounts of information 
and returned to the respondents for further attention. One of the eight was returned and 
eventually used for the study.   
The problem of non-response bias in mailed-questionnaire, and strategies for dealing 
with them, are well documented (see, e.g., Erdos, 1970; Felion, 1990). Armstrong and 
Overton (1997) discuss a number approaches to dealing with the problem, with the “most 
commonly recommended…[being] the reduction of non-response itself.”  They suggest that 
“if appropriate procedures are followed,” non-response should be kept fewer than 30 percent. 
Following this recommendation for this study, reminder post cards were later sent to all of 
the remaining 67 respondents, with 21 responding.  Of the initial 140 mail-outs, 31 were 
returned as “undeliverable” by the post office and 22 respondents did not return their 
questionnaires at all, despite follow-up post-card entreaties to do so.  Based on the foregoing, 
the response rate to the initial 140 mail-outs was 52.1 percent; after the follow-up letters, this 
rate improved to 62.1 percent. However, once the “undeliverables” are removed from the 
computations, the response rate climbs to 79.8 percent, about 10 percentage points higher 
than what was expected.   In the end, 89 valid responses were used for the study (see Table 
7.1).  It must be stated that while the number of valid responses for the study far exceeded the 
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minimum 30 traditionally considered acceptable for statistical analysis (Maddala, 1983), the 
author believes a considerably larger number of responses would provide richer insights 
beyond this theoretical exploration of the black box of the new participation.  This issue is 
taken up further in “Directions and Issues for Future Research” in the final chapter, with the 
proposal that the theoretical framework developed here be applied to a much larger 
constituency of participants in a more contemporary setting. 
Table 7-1   Summary of Mail-outs and Response Rates 
  Total mail-outs * 140  
  Initial Responses 75  
  After 2 follow-ups 21  
  Total Responses  96  
  Number of Incompletes 8  
  Re-mailed incompletes 8  
  Returned Incompletes 1  
  Total (96) less 7 unreturned incompletes 89  
  No. of non-respondents 51  
      Of which "undeliverable" 31  
      Non-responsive (after follow-ups) 20  
  Initial Response rate 53.6%  
  Final Response Rate 63.6%  
  Final Response Rate Adjusted for 30 Undeliverables 81.7%  
     
* After vetting initial list of 240 for lack of address, telephone, or e-mail info. 
 
  Once the data were collected in line with the procedures outlined above, the data were 
analyzed and the findings were interpreted within the context of the hypotheses put forth earlier 
as well as the review of the literature. The analysis was conducted in three stages: descriptive, 
bivariate, and multivariate, based on Dometrius (1992).  The basic statistical framework is the 
“contingency table”. 
  The descriptive analysis section discusses the salient characteristics of respondents, 
including a discussion of regional and other distributions in comparison with similar national 
statistics.  This section also offers a preliminary assessment of respondents’ views on the various 
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components of their participation in SAPRI.  The appropriate tables showing the frequency and 
their correspondent percentages of response are also reproduced, alongside the analyses.  The 
bivariate analysis sequentially evaluated the basic statistical relationships between each 
component of successful participation and each explanatory variable. During this stage of the 
analysis, no effort was made to control for the potential effects of other (extraneous) variables 
while establishing the statistical and substantive relationships between each pair of variables.7 To 
establish a statistically significant relationship between participation, which is the dependent 
variable, and each explanatory variable, the Chi square statistic was used at the 0.05 level of 
significance. If a probability value (p-value) of less than .05 was obtained, the null hypothesis 
that there is no association or “dependence” between participation and any of the explanatory 
variables was rejected.  The preliminary conclusion would thus be that the relationship between 
the variables was in fact statistically significant.  If, however, the p-value turned out to be greater 
than the stated significance level of .05, the null hypothesis was not rejected and it was 
concluded that the observed relationship between the variables of interest is not statistically 
strong enough to be significant. 
  If a statistically significant relationship was observed between each component of 
successful participation and any other variable, the next step was to establish substantive 
significance by answering the question:  How strong was the observed relationship? To do this, 
we turn to correlational analysis, using gamma and Kendall’s tau coefficients, the standard 
measures of correlational strength between ordinal variables.  It was expected, in line with the 
hypotheses of the study, that each correlation coefficient would be positive and significant.  A 
test of each coefficient for substantive significance at the .05 level was then conducted, with a 
 
7   Statistical significance for the Chi-square serves as a threshold in confirming or disconfirming the hypothesized 
relationship between any two variables, without dealing with the strength of that relationship, which may be low or 
high.  To determine this strength, we establish substantive significance through correlational analysis. 
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null hypothesis that the true coefficient is actually zero (i.e., the observed relationship between 
participation and the independent variables was a statistical artifact).  If a p-value lower than .05 
was obtained, the null hypothesis was rejected and the research hypothesis was confirmed, i.e., 
the observed relationship is substantively significant. If, however, the p-value turned out to be 
greater than the stated significance level, the null hypothesis would not be rejected and it would 
then be concluded that indeed, there is no relationship of substantive significance between the 
two variables. 
  The third and final stage of the analysis elaborates on the preceding two stages by going 
beyond bivariate analysis (which does not control for the effects of other variables) and attempts 
to strengthen the analysis by controlling for the effects of these other explanatory variables; this 
method has the advantage of eliminating or at least explaining factors other than the independent 
variable that may indirectly account for variations in the dependent variable during the bivariate 
analysis. In this regard, the gamma and Kendall’s tau coefficients are re-computed and used to 
re-measure the strength of association between participation and the explanatory variables 
simultaneously with the control variables.  Each part (or “item”) of the control variable is then 
analyzed against the results of bivariate analysis.  The test of substantive significance would be 
the same as in the bivariate analysis – that is, based on the gamma and Kendall’s tau-b statistics.  
  If the re-measured relationships turned out to be essentially the same as the original ones 
(i.e., significant p-values), the hypothesized relationship between participation and the 
explanatory variables tested at the first two stages of the analysis was send to be replicated and 
thus validated. We can then draw the stronger conclusion that variations in the independent 
variable do in fact lead to substantive variations in the dependent variable. 
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If, however, the relationship between participation and the independent variables is 
replicated for some parts of the control variables but not others, we can only draw conditional 
conclusions that the original relationships hold for a subgroup of the control variable but not the 
others. 
7.3. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
Like any study, this one is not without its limitations – limitations that with the benefit of 
future research can be addressed as part of the cumulative process of enhancing knowledge in the 
social sciences in general and in relation to the topic of the new participation in particular.  One 
possible limitation is the time span of about two-and-half years between the completion of the 
SAPRI exercise and the conduct of the survey.  This may ordinarily be considered “too long” a 
time to facilitate the fresh recall of information by the respondents.  Nevertheless, studies of 
longer time-spans have been conducted that yielded useful new information.  It is expected that 
this study would be no different, with the caveat that any future efforts at replication consider 
such issues. Finally, as with all statistical methods, the contingency-tables approach used for this 
study has its strengths and weakness.  It, for instances, relaxes the rather strict conditions of 
distribution of the underlying survey data without losing essential information for the ensuing 
analysis.  The contingency table is also easy to interpret, for both the layperson and the 
professional.  But out of this simplicity may arise the problem of too many “empty cells,” or zero 
counts, for items in a variable.  (For example, we may have 10 females and no males in a 
population of 10 for the variable “sex”).  Liao (2000) describes three types of empty cells:  (1) 
sampling zero, where the sample size, such as “Chinese American farmers in Illinois”, makes it 
all but impossible to obtain any counts; (2) structural zero, where it is theoretically impossible to 
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have a count, such as male users of diaphragm contraceptive; and (3) a sparse contingency table, 
which may have lower observed values, “be they zero or not.” 
 The greater the number of categories (such as “education levels”) in a variable (such as 
“education”), the greater the likelihood of having empty cells and thus compromising the 
integrity of the analysis.   To avoid this problem, Liao (2000) recommends “collapsibility,” or 
the recoding of the original data into fewer categories, such that items such as “strongly 
disagree” and “disagree” may be combined into a single category of “disagree.” The objective is 
to minimize the incidence of sparseness, if any, of the contingency table and thus enhance the 
quality of the analysis.  Where, appropriate (in the analysis and interpretation section), this 
advice has been followed. 
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8. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
8.1. GENERAL  CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS  
 
  Of the total 89 respondents to the questionnaire, 71 (about 80 percent) were male. The 
sex composition of the study’s respondents, however, needs to be situated within the larger 
framework of sex distribution in the Ghanaian population, particularly the literate segment, 
which is the only one capable of taking part in an English-only exercise like SAPRI.  According 
to the 2000 national census (GSS 2002), some 53.3 percent of Ghana’s population 15 years and 
older were literate in either English or a known Ghanaian language. But the report also points out 
that “since much of the literature and mass communication [in the country] is in English, the 
effective literacy level [for English] is 46.9 percent.”  For males, the effective literacy rate was 
56.0 percent, while that of the female population was 38.3 percent.  Such disparities inevitably 
reduce the number of eligible female adults available for policy research, although the general 
female population accounts for just over 50.0 percent of the total Ghanaian population. 
  National averages also tend to disguise significant disparities across the 10 administrative 
regions of the country, especially disparities between the three economically deprived northern 
regions and the rest of the country.8 The same report from the Statistical Service also notes, for 
example, that the illiteracy rate in Greater Accra Region (home to the national capital and hence 
the disproportionate beneficiary of most socio-economic infrastructure and services) was 20.6 
 
8   See, Poverty Trends in Ghana in the 1990s, Ghana Statistical Service, Accra, 2000. 
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percent, but those for the Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions were 78.7 percent, 78.1 
percent, and 75.5 percent, respectively. 
  Combined with the comparatively low level of physical infrastructure and economic 
development in these regions, the pronounced disparities in literacy levels have important 
implications for policy research in terms of the researcher’s ability to reach potential respondents 
on an equitable basis.  In addition to having a comparatively small pool of literate participants to 
choose from, the researcher also faces the task of reaching people who have limited or no access 
to such basic facilities as post offices or telephones.   Despite these limitations, all efforts were 
made to ensure that as much as possible the responses reflected the regional distribution of the 
140 respondents originally short-listed for the study.  Table 8.1 shows that with the noticeable 
exception of Greater Accra, the responses did roughly follow the distribution of the 140 
participants.   
 62 
 
Table 8-1  Distribution of Respondents Versus SAPRI Participants 
 Regional 
Distribution of 
Participants  
Share of 
Regional 
Distribution (%) 
Number of Survey 
Responses  
 Share of Survey 
Responses (%) 
Ashanti Region 14 10.0 9 10.1 
Greater Accra 45 32.1 22 24.7 
Eastern Region 11 7.9 10 11.2 
Western Region  13 9.4 11 12.4 
B.A. Region 10 7.1 7 7.9 
Northern Region 6 4.3 5 5.6 
Volta Region 12 8.6 7 7.9 
Central Region  14 10.1 7 7.9 
Upper East 7 5.0 4 4.5 
Upper West  8 5.7 7 7.9 
Total  140 100.0 89 100.0       
 
   
  The educational characteristics of respondents appear in Table 8.4.  Just over 10.0 percent 
of respondents had had up to secondary school education, while another 27.0 percent claimed 
post-secondary, non-university education (such as technical and vocational schools). About 33.0 
percent had first university degrees (B.A. or B.Sc.), 22.5 percent had master’s degrees of some 
kind, with another 4.5 percent having doctorate degrees.  A minority of 3.4 percent had “other” 
levels of education.  Since English literacy is a minimum requirement for participation in any 
forum on national policy making, one would expect that the educational qualifications of 
respondents would be higher than the national average.  And indeed they are, according to the 
Fourth Ghana Living Standards Survey.  Only 10.4 percent of Ghanaians were found to have 
attained “secondary or higher” levels  “of education. In this respect, the respondents (and most 
likely the general group of participants) can be said to be atypical of the national population – 
generally better educated. 
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Table 8-2 Educational Attainment of Respondents 
 
  Frequency 
Percent of 
Respondents 
Secondary School 9 10.1 
  
Post-secondary non-university 24 27.0 
  
Post-secondary university (BA/BSc.) 29 32.6 
  
Post-secondary university (MA/MSc) 20 22.5 
  
Post-secondary university (doctorate) 4 4.5 
  
Other 3 3.4 
  
Total 89 100.0 
No respondent reported only pre-secondary education. 
 
 
 In summary, it must be stated that a study of this nature that seeks to reflect as much as 
possible national phenomena and trends faces several structural challenges, such as wide 
disparities in literacy rates between men and women, and among regions, as well as the 
pronounced differences between various parts of the country in terms of infrastructure 
development and hence access to research subjects.  Against this background, and other 
limitations, such as the poor quality of the list of participants, it is nearly impossible to select 
participants on the basis of a statistically representative sample of the national population. When 
compared to the original list of 140 participants selected for the study, however, the regional 
distribution of responses broadly mirrored that of the participants, the only notable exception 
being Greater Accra, where the response rate was considerably lower, although still higher than 
any other region’s.   
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8.2. SALIENT CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS’ ORGANIZATIONS   
 
  To measure the capacity of participants’ organizations to provide them with policy-
relevant information for purposes of participation, respondents were asked to assess their 
organizations’ capacity to collect and analyze such information for purposes of participation. The 
results are summarized in Table 8.5. Just over half – 53.9 percent – agreed that their 
organizations had the facilities to collect information on economic and social policies; 36.0 
percent said their organizations lacked such facilities, and another 10.1 percent offered no 
opinion on the topic. In terms of their organizations’ human capacity to analyze any information 
they may obtain, 21.3 percent said they had no such capacity; 4.5 percent offered no opinion; 
while the remaining 74.2 percent reported that their organizations indeed had such a capacity. 
Asked whether or not they thought receiving policy-relevant information from government was 
“difficult”, 57.3 percent said it was not difficult, while another 21.9 percent said it was difficult. 
About 16.0 percent had no opinion.  Overall, therefore, participants seemed to view their 
organizations as having the analytical capacity to support their efforts at participation.  The 
relatively high score that respondents assign their organizations’ analytical capacity may be 
partly reflective of current efforts by international organizations and donor countries to “build 
the capacity of civil society organizations”.  These capacity-building efforts have included both 
human resource training at home and abroad, and well as the supply of equipment and furniture 
to various civil-society organizations around the country. 
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Table 8-3  Policy-Analytic Capacity of Participants’ Organizations 
 
  
Organization 
Has Information 
Gathering Facilities 
 
Organization has Technical 
Capacity to Analyze Policy-
relevant Data 
 
Obtaining Policy-relevant Info 
from Government Is Difficult 
Strongly Disagree 4.5 2.2 12.5 
Disagree 31.5 19.1 44.9 
No Opinion  10.1 4.5 15.7 
Agree 39.3 58.4 21.3 
Strongly Agree 14.6 15.7 5.6 
 
  More detailed information on the participants’ organizations’ ability to communicate with 
the rest of the world (and thus presumably be adequately informed about policy issues of the 
day) was also collected.  The results are summarized in Table 8.6 below.  About 24.0 percent 
reported having no telephone facilities. Of those who had them, 32.6 percent said those facilities 
worked most of the time, while 42.7 percent said they worked some of the time; only 1.1 said 
they did not work at all. Slightly more than 65.0 percent had no fax facilities, a critical deficiency 
in an era of real-time information and communication technology.  About 14.0 percent said they 
had such facilities and that they worked most of the time, while 15.7 percent said theirs worked 
only some of the time. About 6.0 percent said their fax facilities did not work.  These findings do 
not only reflect the limits of capacity building efforts for CSOs but also a pressing need for them 
to do more to address such deficiencies.  
Table 8-4  Participant’s Organizations’ Access to Information-Communications Facilities 
 Telephone 
Availability 
 
Fax Availability 
Computer 
Availability 
Internet Availability 
Have None 23.6 65.2 39.3 73.0 
Never Works 1.1 5.6 1.1 1.1 
Works 
Sometimes 
42.7 15.7 28.1 18 
Works Most 
Times 
32.6 13.5 31.5 7.9 
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  With respect to computer ownership, about 40.0 percent said their offices had none, about 
32.0 percent said they had computers that worked most of the time, another 28.1 percent said 
their computers only worked sometimes, and just over 1.0 percent said they had computers that 
did not work at all. The proportion of organizations with no access to the internet, not 
surprisingly was very high:  73.0 percent. For 18.0 percent of the organizations represented, their 
internet facilities worked part of the time, while only 7.9 percent had facilities that worked most 
of the time. Another 1.1 percent said their internet facilities never worked at all.  Taken together, 
the findings portray a low level of information-communication technology development among 
participants’ organizations, and hence a diminished capacity to receive or share policy-relevant 
information readily. 
  In order to obtain a consolidated view of the regional breakdown in ICT capabilities of 
the participants’ organizations, an average for each of their responses was computed for each of 
the administrative regions of the country (see Table 8. 7 below). As the table shows, Greater 
Accra, home region of the national capital and a disproportionate beneficiary of development 
resources, has a massive advantage over the rest of the country in terms of access and 
functionality of information and communication technology.  For example, 27.3 percent of 
respondents from the Greater Accra Region alone reported that their ICT equipment, such as 
telephones and fax machines, worked all of the time. This is low by international standards but 
quite high by Ghanaians standards.  For example, only one other respondent, from the Western 
Region (representing 9.1 percent of total responses for that region), reported that their ICT 
facilities worked all the time.  The Upper East, Upper West, Central and (curiously) the Ashanti 
and Eastern regions had very high percentages of respondents reporting that their ICT facilities 
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did not work at all.  The threat to one-way or two-way communication as a form of participation 
cannot be over-emphasized.  
Table 8-5  ICT Equipment (Capacity) of Respondents’ Organizations By Region 
    Have None 
Never 
Works 
Works 
Sometimes 
Works Most of 
the Time 
Works All the 
Time Total  
G. Accra  Frequency 0 4 3 9 6 22 
  
  
Percent by 
Regions .0% 18.2% 13.6% 40.9% 27.3% 100.0% 
Eastern Re Frequency 1 4 2 3 0 10 
  
  
Percent by 
Regions 10.0% 40.0% 20.0% 30.0% .0% 100.0% 
 Western  Frequency 0 2 6 2 1 11 
  
  
Percent by 
Regions .0% 18.2% 54.5% 18.2% 9.1% 100.0% 
 Volta  Frequency 0 3 3 1 0 7 
  
  
Percent by 
Regions .0% 42.9% 42.9% 14.3% .0% 100.0% 
 U. West  Frequency 1 5 1 0 0 7 
  
  
Percent by 
Regions 14.3% 71.4% 14.3% .0% .0% 100.0% 
 U. East  Frequency 1 1 1 1 0 4 
  
  
Percent by 
Regions 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% .0% 100.0% 
Ashanti  Frequency 1 0 7 1 0 9 
  
  
Percent by 
Regions 11.1% .0% 77.8% 11.1% .0% 100.0% 
 Central  Frequency 1 3 1 2 0 7 
  
  
Percent by 
Regions 14.3% 42.9% 14.3% 28.6% .0% 100.0% 
 Northern  Frequency 0 1 2 2 0 5 
  
  
Percent by 
Regions .0% 20.0% 40.0% 40.0% .0% 100.0% 
B. Ahafo  Frequency 0 4 3 0 0 7 
  
  
Percent by 
Regions .0% 57.1% 42.9% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Total Count 5 27 29 21 7 89 
  Percent by 
Regions 5.6% 30.3% 32.6% 23.6% 7.9% 100.0% 
 
  In summary, respondents’ organizations appear to have a relatively good human resource 
base for policy-relevant analyses and its associated activities, but seem to lack adequate levels of 
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information-technology capabilities.  The very low levels of ICT development, in particular, are 
very disturbing, with potentially adverse effects on future participatory efforts. 
 
8.3. RESPONDENTS’ GENERAL VIEWS ON PARTICIPATORY SUCCESS 
 
 Table 8.6 offers a preliminary portrait of respondents’ views on various indicators of 
successful participation.  Information was gathered on ”voice,” that is, the extent to which the 
respondents believed they were able to present the views of their organizations adequately at 
SAPRI.  Of the total 89 respondents, 83.2 percent agreed with the statement, indicating a high 
degree of voice (the effective communication of policy demands) at SAPRI, but another 15.7 
percent disagreed. As a first step towards evaluating participatory success, this is encouraging, 
although matters of representativeness remain.   
 
Table 8-6   ‘Respondents Were Able to Present  
Overall Views of their Organizations at SAPRI’ 
  
  Frequency Percent 
Disagree 14 15.7 
  With respect to the representativeness 
of issues covered, 83.2 percent said issues 
discussed at the forum adequately reflected 
the concerns o civil society in general, with only 5.6 percent of respondents disagreeing (see 
Table 8.9).   This generally high  level of issues representativeness, however, is reduced 
somewhat once the issues are further disaggregated to account for particular groups, such as 
women and children. For example, because it was widely argued by the organizers of SAPRI that 
  1 1.1 No Opinion 
  54 60.7 Agree 
  20 22.5 Strongly Agree 
  89 100.0 Total 
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poverty not only increased under structural adjustment but that it affected women and children 
disproportionately, respondents were asked if they believed that topics covering children, women 
and poverty, in particular, were adequately covered at SAPRI.  The results are summarized 
below in Table 8.10. 
 
Table 8-7  ‘Issues Discussed at SAPRI Reflected  
the Concerns of Civil Society in General’ 
 
 Frequency Percent 
 Disagree 5 5.6 
Table 8-8   ‘The Following Issues Were Adequately 
Discussed at SAPRI’ 
  5 5.6 No Opinion 
  17 19.1 Agree 
  62 69.7 Strongly Agree 
 Children Women Poverty 
  89 100.0 Total 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Strongly Disagree 9 10.1 6 6.7 1 1.1 
Disagree 38 42.7 25 28.1 6 6.7 
No Opinion 9 10.1 5 5.6 3 3.4 
Agree 29 32.6 42 47.2 40 4.9 
Strongly Agree 4 4.5 11 12.4 39 43.8 
 
  Slightly more than half of respondents – 52.8 percent – felt that children’s issues were not 
adequately discussed at the forum, compared to 37.1 percent who felt the opposite, while 10.1 
percent had no opinion one way or another.  Respondents’ views on the discussion of issues 
affecting women were much “better”, with some 59.6 percent of respondent saying that women’s 
issues were adequately covered at the forum while a significant minority – 34.8 percent – 
maintained that the treatment of women’s issues at the forum was inadequate.  With respect to 
poverty, a significantly large proportion of respondents – 88.7 percent agreed that it was 
adequately covered at the forum; only 7.8 percent dissented.  Hence, issues affecting one of the 
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most vulnerable groups in society – children – appeared to have received comparatively little 
attention, despite the generally high levels of issues-representativeness scored by respondents. 
  It is significant to note that the pattern of respondents’ views on interest-group 
representativeness at SAPRI differed markedly from their views on voice and issues 
representativeness discussed in the preceding section.  Of those responding, 48.3 percent did not 
believe that children’s advocacy groups were adequately represented at the forum, although 34.9 
percent felt otherwise (see Table 8.11). The relatively high representation for children’s 
advocacy groups in a situation where 53.0 percent of respondents said that children’s issues were 
not adequately discussed suggests a lack of voice for these advocacy groups, despite their 
significant presence at the forum.  With regards to women’s advocacy groups, 58.5 percent 
agreed that they were adequately represented, a similar proportion (59.6 percent) to those who 
felt that women’s issues were adequately addressed.  The 33.0 percent who did not share this 
view about representation were roughly the same as the 34.8 percent who disagreed that 
women’s issues were adequately discusses.  These preliminary findings on the representativeness 
of women’s groups, compared to those of children, accord with the respondents’ views on how 
well women’s issues were addressed at the forum; it clearly suggests the need for greater voice 
for children’s advocacy groups at similar forums in the future.  As one respondent noted, the 
“absence of …women and children advocacy groups [at SAPRI] has been a set back which has 
to be addressed to play into the process of addressing our economic situation.” (Salami; 
Appendix  D) 
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Table 8-9  ‘Advocacy Groups for the Following Were Adequately Represented’ 
Children Women Poverty  
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Strongly Disagree 9 10.1 5 5.6 2 2.2 
Disagree 34 38.2 24 27.0 5 5.6 
No Opinion 15 16.9 8 9.0 3 3.4 
Agree 28 31.5 41 46.1 37 41.6 
Strongly Agree 3 3.4 11 12.4 42 47.2 
   
  With respect to the regional representativeness of participants, 78.7 percent of 
respondents felt that it was adequate, 8.9 percent disagreed, and 12.4 percent offered no opinion 
(See Table 8.10).   
 
Table 8-10 ‘Regional Representation Was Adequate' 
 
  Frequency Percent 
 Strongly Disagree 2 2.2 
  Disagree 6 6.7 
  No Opinion 11 12.4 
  Agree 37 41.6 
  Strongly Agree 33 37.1 
   
  Questions were also posed about respondents’ views on the impact of SAPRI on public 
policy since the forum was held. The responses, as shown in Table 8.13, also varied considerably 
according to the issues concerned.   About 79.0 percent said they viewed civil society issues as 
having attained more prominence in public policy since SAPRI, with another 12.3 percent 
dissenting and 9.0 percent offering no opinion. A slightly lower proportion – 64.0 percent – of 
respondents believed that children’s issues have gained similar prominence in public policy as a 
result of SAPRI, with 17.9 percent dissenting and another 18.0 percent expressing no views one 
way or another. With regards to women’s issues, some 70.8 percent felt that the state was paying 
more attention to them since SAPRI, while 15.7 percent disagreed, and another 13.5 percent 
offered no views. Finally, respondents were asked if they thought that poverty issues had attained 
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more prominence in public policy as a result of SAPRI.  About 70.0 percent said they had, while 
22.4 percent disagreed and just under 8.0 percent proffered no opinion. 
  The respondents’ views that, compared to other issues (e.g., women’s situation and 
poverty), children’s issues gained less attention in public policy since SAPRI only reinforces 
their assertion earlier that, despite the high presence of child advocacy groups at the Forum, 
issues about children were not adequately addressed there. This in turn means that such issues 
continue to attract little attention in policy circles, despite the existence of various government 
agencies devoted to children’s welfare. 
 
Table 8-11  ‘Issues about the Following have Attained Policy Prominence Since SAPRI’ 
Civil Society Women Children Poverty  
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.1 2 2.2 2 2.2 2 2.2 
Disagree 10 11.2 12 13.5 14 15.7 18 20.2 
No Opinion 8 9.0 12 13.5 16 18.0 7 7.9 
Agree 51 57.3 45 50.6 44 49.4 50 56.2 
Strongly Agree 19 21.3 18 20.2 13 14.6 12 13.5 
 
 
8.4. RESPONDENTS’ GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF POLICY ISSUES 
 
To be able to participate effectively in a forum on the formulation of national policies, it 
is important that the participants have a fairly good knowledge and understanding of the kinds of 
issues that go into the formulation of these policies.  The study adopted two ways of measuring 
this knowledge:  Participants’ general knowledge of key economic and other issues in public 
policy as well as the usefulness of seminars and workshops specifically designed for them prior 
to their involvement in SAPRI. The results are discussed as they appear in Table 8.14.  
 With the exception of structural adjustment issues in general, fewer than half of the 
respondents reported having “above average” knowledge of any of the main policy issues 
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presented to them – monetary policy, fiscal policy, international trade, government expenditures, 
government revenue, and foreign aid.  Just over 50.0 percent said they had above-average 
knowledge of structural adjustment programs.  Given the public controversy over the effects of 
structural adjustment, it is not surprising that participants would declare above-average 
knowledge of the issues at stake.  The other two issue areas that respondents reported above 
average knowledge – monetary policy and fiscal policy – also generated widespread controversy 
because of their palpable effects on everyday life.  Under monetary policy, for instance, the 
country’s currency, the cedi, has been depreciating over the years, leading to higher consumer 
inflation and complaints from the public.   
 In terms of their overall knowledge of the policy issues presented to them in the survey, 
only 38.2 percent of respondents reported an above-average level of knowledge.  A slim majority 
of 50.6 percent reported an average level of knowledge while the remaining 11.2 percent 
reported a below average level of knowledge. 
Table 8-12  Respondents Self-rated Knowledge of Economic Issues and SAPs (%) 
Knowledge of: Below Average Average Above Average 
   Monetary Policy 16.9 50.6 32.6 
   Fiscal Policy 19.1 49.4 31.5 
   International Trade 14.6 51.7 33.7 
   Government Spending 16.9 42.7 40.4 
   Government Revenue 12.4 40.4 47.2 
   Foreign Aid 11.2 46.1 42.7 
   Structural Adjustment 6.7 42.7 50.6 
Overall Rating 11.2 50.6 38.2 
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Figure 8-1 'Respondents' Overall Knowledge of Policy Issues 
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8.5. RESPONDENTS’ KNOWLEDGE OF FORUM-SPECIFIC ISSUES 
 
 What respondents lacked in general knowledge of policy issues was addressed, to some 
extent, through workshops and seminars conducted by the organizers of SAPRI for the 
participants.  Only 2.2 percent disagreed in one form or another that the workshops were useful 
to them, just over 20.0 percent had no opinion, while a respectable majority of 77.5 percent 
agreed that the workshops were in fact useful (see Figure 8.2). Judging by the responses of the 
participants, these workshops appeared to have aided them specifically in their participation. 
                       
Figure 8-2  Economic Literacy Workshops Prior to  SAPRI Were Useful 
2.2
20.2
77.5
0
20
40
60
80
Disagree No Opinion Agree
 
 75 
 
 How participants viewed the efficacy and/or fairness of the whole SAPRI process, from 
preparation to the actual forum, was considered an equally important research question.  The 
results are summarized in Table 8.15.  With some consistency, between 60.0 percent and 67.0 
percent felt that they were given enough time to prepare for the forum and make their 
contributions during the forum and that the various moderators allowed them, whenever they 
wanted to, to make such contributions.  Those disagreeing with this assessment ranged between 
30.0 percent and 32.0 percent.  While those disagreeing represented a smaller proportion of 
respondents, their number – one out of every three participants – appears significant enough to 
warrant the attention of future forums of this nature. 
8.6. ESTABLISHING INTRA-EPISODE SUCCESS 
 
8.6.1.   Hypothesis Testing  
 This section of the analysis is based on contingency tables and their associated statistics.  
In order to minimize possible problems of sparse or empty cells (as discussed in the section on 
research design), the original data has been recoded from five items to three; the ordinality of the 
data is retained.  The three dependent scale variables of interest are voice, inclusiveness, and 
impact.  To ensure that the scales are reliable and consistent in their measurement of their 
underlying constructs, Cronbach’s alpha or index of reliability was computed for each of them 
based on Santos (2000). The index ranges between 0 and 1, with 1, indicating perfect reliability.  
An alpha of 0.9 was obtained for “voice”, which was considerably higher than the 0.7 deemed 
acceptable by Nunnaly (1978). The alpha for “inclusiveness” was 0.7 while that of “impact” was 
0.5. All were significant at the 05 level, although marginally so for “impact”, indicating the 
potential for improvements in future research. The alphas for economic literacy, analytical 
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capacity, and process were, respectively, 0.6, 0.5, and 0.7. Each hypothesized relationship 
between each dependent variable and the independent variables is stated and tested, and the 
results are analyzed accordingly. 
  
8.6.2.   Relationship between Inclusiveness and SAPRI’s Organizational Arrangements 
Null hypothesis:  Inclusiveness and SAPRI’s Organizational Arrangements (Process) 
are independent of each other.   
Research hypothesis:  Inclusiveness and SAPRI’s Organizational Arrangements 
(Process) are not independent of each other.  
 
 How, according to research question (v), did the participants view the overall 
organizational arrangements of SAPRI (process) and its effects on their perceived level or degree 
of inclusiveness at the forum, in terms of policy issues, advocacy groups, and the 10 
administrative regions of the country?  Thirty-nine respondents out of the total of 89 agreed that 
the forum’s organizational arrangement greatly facilitated their contributions at SAPRI, with 
61.5 percent simultaneously saying that they considered the forum to have been inclusive, along 
the lines of issues, groups and administrative regions, as discussed earlier. Of those who 
disagreed over the facilitatory quality of the forum’s process, nearly 22.0 percent also disagreed 
over the issues of inclusiveness. The results are summarized in Table 8.13. 
 The overall pattern of responses does suggest, however, that the more a person found the 
forum’s organizational arrangements to have facilitated their participation, the more inclined 
they were to consider the forum as inclusive.  The p-value of <.001 for the chi-square means that 
we can confidently reject the null hypothesis of independence between inclusiveness and process 
and thus accept the research hypothesis.  The p-value of <.001 for both gamma and tau-b is 
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further testimony to the strength of the relationship between the two variables. In other words, 
the organizational efforts of the organizers, both prior to and during SAPRI, in the eyes of the 
participants, did pay off in terms of the democratic inclusiveness of the forum.  Nevertheless, 
there were some participants who saw the forum as being less inclusive in terms of 
administrative regions and social groups. On respondent suggested that “future programs for 
SAPRI should also focus on the northern sector of Ghana,”, while another went a step further 
and suggested that “such forums could start from the district level to enable more people to take 
part, so as to broaden the participatory basis of the discussion) (Sakyi, Appendix A) 
Table 8-13   Relationship Between Inclusiveness and Organizational Arrangements of SAPRI  
    
Organizational Arrangements for SAPRI 
Greatly Facilitated Participants’ 
Contributions Total 
    Disagree No Opinion Agree   
Inclusiveness Disagree Frequency 3 1 0 4
    Percent within 
column responses 21.4% 2.8% .0% 4.5%
  No Opinion Frequency 9 23 15 47
    Percent within 
column responses 64.3% 63.9% 38.5% 52.8%
  Agree Frequency 2 12 24 38
    Percent within 
column responses 14.3% 33.3% 61.5% 42.7%
Total Total Count 14 36 39 89
  Total Percentage 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square and Correlation Tests 
  Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.257 4 .000 
 
  Value Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .381 .000 
  Gamma .620 .000  
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8.6.3.   Relationship between Inclusiveness and Policy-analytic Capacity of Participants’ 
Organizations 
 
Null hypothesis:  Inclusiveness and the analytical capacity of participants’ organizations 
are independent of each other.   
Research hypothesis:  Inclusiveness and the analytical capacity of participants’ 
organizations are not independent of each other. 
 This hypothesis relates to research question (iv) and the results appear in Table 8.14.  Of 
all the respondents who felt that their respective organizations had adequate analytical capacity 
for purposes of participation, 50.0 percent also agreed that the forum was inclusiveness in every 
respect, with just 15.4 percent disagreeing simultaneously on both scores.  Significantly, a large 
proportion of respondents either expressed “no opinion” or disagreement with the assertion that 
the analytical capacity of their organizations helped them to establish the inclusiveness of the 
overall forum.  Indeed, of the 62 persons who offered no opinion on analytical capacity, just over 
half also expressed no opinion on inclusiveness.  Evidently, participants saw very little 
relationship between their organizations’ ability to conduct policy analysis and the inclination of 
the organizers to make the forum inclusive.  This conclusion is statistically and intuitively 
appealing, since the policy analytical capacity of a respondent’s organization should have no 
direct bearing on forums’ organizers’ inclination to make the forum representative.   
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Table 8-14  Relationship Between Inclusiveness  and Policy-analytic Capacity  
My Organization Had the Capacity to 
    
 
 
8.6.4. Relationship between Inclusiveness and Economic Literacy.  
Null hypothesis:  Inclusiveness and participants’ level of economic literacy are 
independent of each other. 
Research hypothesis:  Inclusiveness and participants’ level of economic literacy are not 
independent of each other. 
 This hypothesis was postulated within the context of research question (iii), dealing with 
the level of economic literacy of participants and their successful participation.  The responses 
appear in Table 8.15.  Of the 68 respondents who agreed that the economic literacy workshops 
Provide Policy Analysis for SAPRI Total 
    Disagree No Opinion Agree   
Inclusiveness  Disagree Frequency 2 1 1 4
    Percent within 
15.4% 1.6% 7.1% 4.5%column responses 
  No Opinion Frequency 9 32 6 47
    Percent within 
69.2% 51.6% 42.9% 52.8%column responses 
  Agree Frequency 2 29 7 38
    Percent within 
15.4% 46.8% 50.0% 42.7%column responses 
Total Total Count 13 62 14 89
  Total Percentage 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square and Correlation Tests 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
  Value Df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.425 4 .077 
 
 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .189 .071 
  Gamma .361 .071 
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provided by SAPRI organizers prior to the exercise were helpful to their participation 50.0 
percent also agreed that the overall forum was inclusive of all major groups, issues and 
administrative regions, with only 1.5 percent disagreeing.  Indeed, the greater the level of 
satisfaction with economic literacy, the greater the likelihood that the respondent would see the 
forum as all-inclusive.  With the p-values for all three measures of independence and correlation 
much lower than the .05 level of significance, the null hypothesis that there is no association 
between the two variables is rejected.  
Table 8-15  Relationship Between Inclusiveness and Economic literacy 
 
Economic Literacy Seminar Prior to SAPRI 
    Total Helped me Contribute Effectively 
    Disagree No Opinion Agree   
Inclusiveness  
 
 
 
Disagree Frequency 0 3 1 4
    Percent within 
column responses .0% 15.8% 1.5% 4.5%
  No Opinion Frequency 2 12 33 47
    Percent within 
100.0% 63.2% 48.5% 52.8%column responses 
  Agree Frequency 0 4 34 38
    Percent within 
.0% 21.1% 50.0% 42.7%column responses 
Total Total Count 2 19 68 89
  Total Percentage 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square and Correlation Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
  Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.119 4 .016 
 
 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .300 .002 
  Gamma .629 .002 
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8.6.5. Relationship between Voice and SAPRI’s Organizational Arrangements   
Null hypothesis:  Voice and SAPRI’s organizational arrangements (Process) are 
independent of each other. 
Research hypothesis:  Voice and SAPRI’s organizational arrangements (Process) are not 
independent of each other 
These hypotheses were posed to jointly address question (ii) (ability to discuss issues 
affecting civil society) and question (v) (the impact of organizational effectiveness on 
participation).  The results appear in Table 8.16.  Almost all the 39 respondents who saw the 
organizational arrangements of SAPRI both prior to and during the forum as greatly facilitating 
their participation ( 94.9 percent) also agreed that they were able to express adequately all the 
policy demands (views) of their organization at the forum. Not surprisingly, some 42.9 percent 
of those who saw the process as non-facilitatory of their participation also said that they were not 
able to adequately articulate their views at the forum.  Fifty percent nevertheless felt that they 
were able to successfully present the policy concerns and demands of their organization as they 
wished, an indication that they may have encountered various difficulties in their efforts to 
participate in the forum, difficulties which might have diminished the effectiveness of their 
involvement in the forum.  From these responses, it appears that the higher the satisfaction a 
respondent found with the organizational arrangements of the forum, the more satisfied they also 
were with the degree to which they were able to make their policy demands at SAPRI.  The 
significant p-values confirm the relationship between voice and organizational facilitation. 
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Table 8-16   Relationship Between Voice and Organizational Arrangements 
    
Presentation Arrangements at SAPRI 
Greatly Facilitated my Contributions Total 
    Disagree No Opinion Agree   
Voice  (All views of my 
organization were successfully 
expressed at SAPRI) 
Disagree Frequency 
6 8 2 16
    Percent within column 
responses 42.9% 22.2% 5.1% 18.0%
  No Opinion Frequency 1 0 0 1
    Percent within column 
responses 7.1% .0% .0% 1.1%
  Agree Frequency 7 28 37 72
    Percent within column 
responses 50.0% 77.8% 94.9% 80.9%
Total Total Count 14 36 39 89
  Total Percentage 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square and Correlation Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.757 4 .002
  
 
 
 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .353 .000
  Gamma .693 .000
 
 
 
8.6.6. Relationship between Voice and Policy-analytic Capacity of Participants’ 
Organizations 
 
Null hypothesis:  Voice and the policy-analytic capacity of participants’ organizations 
are independent of each other. 
Research hypothesis:  Voice and the policy-analytic capacity of participants’ 
organizations are not independent of each other. 
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 The hypotheses here deal with research question (iv) in relation to the “voice” of 
respondents at the forum vis-à-vis their organizational backgrounds; the results appear in Table 
8.20.  In addressing this question, a total of 14 out of 89 respondents conceded that their 
organizations had the policy analytical capacity to equip them with the requisite information to 
participate in a forum like SAPRI (see Table 8.17). Of those conceding, 85.7 percent also agreed 
that they were able to present all the views of their organizations at the forum.  By contrast, some 
54 percent of respondents doubted their organizations’ analytical capacity while at the same time 
saying that they were able to exercise adequate voice at the forum.  Another 38.5 percent 
simultaneously cited both a lack of analytical capacity and voice, while 85.5 percent who had no 
opinion on the question of analytical capacity nevertheless said they exercised enough voice.  
 Given these facts, how significant is the relationship between the two variables – voice 
and policy-analytic capacity?   With a the p-value of .029 (less than .05), the Chi-square 
confirmed the research hypotheses, while at values greater than 05, the measures of strength of 
association indicated the relationship between the two variables was not strong enough, 
statistically.]  This conclusion is not as improbable or contradictory as it may seem.9  There are 
at least two plausible explanations for it.  It may be that the relationship between the two 
variables as presently measured is not linear, an assumption behind both Kendall’s tau and 
gamma.  Secondly, there may be some other intervening factors whose influences are not 
reflected in this simple bivariate relationship.  The next level of the analysis, when control 
variables are introduced, will help us elaborate on this part further. At this preliminary stage, 
 
9   Dometrius (1992) warns that gamma, though the more popular and “versatile” of the two measures, tends to be “a 
bit generous in measuring relationships.”  Kendall’s tau-b was thus introduced to “compensate” for the generosity of 
gamma, which uses somewhat more restrictive criteria.  (While Kendall’s tau-b is used exclusively for square or 
equal-item contingency tables, tau-c is applied in situations where the table is rectangular or of unequal number of 
items in the ordinal variables). 
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though, it does suggest that contrary to what the literature says (see, e.g., Servaes, 1995), it will 
take more than strong analytical capacities for civil society organizations or their representatives 
to be heard at public forums; organizational arrangements also play a critical mediating role in 
establishing the voice of civil society at public forums.  This is eloquently confirmed by one of 
the respondents as follows:  “The involvement of civil society in decision-making has made 
SAPRI a unique programme…However, from my own experience, participants were not allowed 
to adequately express their views, even though they were allowed to talk whenever they wanted 
to.” (A.B. Ibn Hassan, – Appendix D). 
 
Table 8-17  Relationship Between Voice and Organization’s Policy Analytical Capacity 
   
My Organization Had the Capacity to 
Provide Policy Analysis for SAPRI Total 
    Disagree No Opinion Agree   
VOICE  (All views of 
my organization were 
successfully expressed at 
SAPRI) 
Disagree Frequency 
5 9 2 16
    Percent within column 
responses 38.5% 14.5% 14.3% 18.0%
  No Opinion Frequency 1 0 0 1
    Percent within column 
responses 7.7% .0% .0% 1.1%
  Agree Frequency 7 53 12 72
    Percent within column 
responses 53.8% 85.5% 85.7% 80.9%
Total Total Count 13 62 14 89
  Total Percentages 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square and Correlation Tests 
 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.777 4 .029
 
   Value Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .200 .089
  Gamma .439 .089
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8.6.7.  Relationship between Voice and Economic Literacy of Participants  
Null hypothesis:  Voice and participants’ knowledge of economic issues are independent 
of each other. 
Research hypothesis:  Voice and participants’ knowledge of economic issues are not 
independent of each other.  
 
These hypotheses reflect a restatement of question (iii) in relation to voice and education 
or economic literacy, as previously defined.  Reflecting the great importance that participants 
evidently attached to the workshops on economic and structural adjustment issues prior to 
SAPRI, at total of 68 of them found the workshops to have helped them in contributing 
effectively at the forum. Of those expressing this view, 85.3 percent conceded that they were 
able to effectively deliver all the policy positions of their organizations at SAPRI, while some 
63.2 percent agreed that they were able to present all the policy positions of their organizations at 
SAPRI although they were not sure about the usefulness of the economic literacy programs (see 
Table 8.18). The remaining responses, however, showed no systematic patterns in respondents’ 
assessment of economic literacy in relation to voice. This is statistically confirmed by the higher 
than normal p-values of both the measures of association and of strength. It seems, from this 
result, that economic literacy may be a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for 
promoting voice at a participatory episode like SAPRI.  Other factors, such as a facilitatory 
“process”, or organizational arrangements, may well prove equally important, if not more so, for 
a forum of this nature.  We shall elaborate on this point during the next level of analysis. 
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Table 8-0-18 Relationship Between Voice and Economic Literacy 
    
Economic Literacy Seminar Prior to SAPRI 
Helped me Contribute Effectively Total 
    Disagree No Opinion Agree   
Voice  (All views of 
my organization were 
successfully 
expressed at SAPRI) 
Disagree Frequency 
0 6 10 16
    Percent within 
column responses .0% 31.6% 14.7% 18.0%
  No Opinion Frequency 0 1 0 1
    Percent within 
column responses .0% 5.3% .0% 1.1%
  Agree Frequency 2 12 58 72
    Percent within 
column responses 100.0% 63.2% 85.3% 80.9%
Total Total Count 2 19 68 89
  Total Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square and Correlation Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.396 4 .116 
 
  Value Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .179 .127 Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .425 .127  
 
 
 
In summary, the preceding section looked at factors affecting intra-episode success by 
testing a number of hypotheses, using bivariate analyses to examine the statistical relationship 
between inclusiveness and voice, on the one hand, and organizational arrangements, policy-
analytic capacity, and economic literacy, on the other.  The hypothesis that inclusiveness and 
organizational arrangements had no statistically significant relationship was rejected while 
economic literacy and inclusiveness were found to be related in a statistically significant way.  
The postulated relationship between inclusiveness and the policy analytic capacity of 
respondents’ organizations, however, was not rejected.  The ability of participants to present 
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their case at SAPRI was found to be strongly associated with the organizational arrangements of 
the forum’s organizers.  The link between voice and analytical capacity, however, was mixed – 
while a relationship existed, it was weak, perhaps because others factors will have to be jointly 
considered while assessing that relationship. 
 
8.7. ESTABLISHING POST-EPISODE SUCCESS 
 
8.7.1.   Relationship between Impact and Organizational Arrangements (Process) 
Null hypothesis:  Impact and organizational arrangements for SAPRI (Process) are 
independent of each other.  
Research hypothesis:  Impact and the organizational arrangements for SAPRI (Process) 
are not independent of each other. 
 
 These hypotheses reflect the sixth research question, which was designed to address the 
issue of post-episode success as viewed by participants, in contrast to the indicators of intra-
episode success discussed in the preceding section.  The results appear in Table 8.19 below.  
About 40 respondents agreed that the organizational arrangement both prior to and during the 
forum were helpful to their contributions at the forum. Just over 80.0 percent of these also saw 
the forum to have subsequently had a noticeable impact on public policy, while a significant 10.3 
percent had neither an opinion on organizational arrangements nor the impact of the forum on 
public policy afterwards. Despite these assessments, the respondents also displayed a great deal 
of ambivalence towards the relationship between the two variables (impact and process), as 
evidenced by the high number of those offering no opinion on either one.  
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 Not surprisingly, the measures of independence and association are higher than the .05 
significance threshold, an indication that organizational arrangements, which were more relevant 
to the forum itself, would have any bearing on subsequent developments in public policy.  We 
will need to consider other variables to explain participants’ assessment of the subsequent impact 
of the forum on public policy. 
 
Table 8-19 Relationship Between Impact and Organizational Arrangements (Process) 
 
    
Organizational Arrangements for SAPRI 
Greatly Facilitated Participants’ 
Contributions Total 
    Disagree No Opinion Agree   
SAPRI Has 
influenced Public 
Policy in Ghana 
(IMPACT) 
Disagree Frequency 
1 2 3 6
    Percent within 
column responses 7.1% 5.6% 7.7% 6.7%
  No Opinion Frequency 5 11 4 20
    Percent within 
column responses 35.7% 30.6% 10.3% 22.5%
  Agree Frequency 8 23 32 63
    Percent within 
column responses 57.1% 63.9% 82.1% 70.8%
Total Total Count 14 36 39 89
  Total Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square and Correlation Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.169 4 .187 
 
 
 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .188 .056 
  Gamma .340 .056 
 
 
 
 
8.7.2. Relationship between Impact and Analytical Capacity of Participants’ 
Organizations  
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Null hypothesis:  Impact and the analytical capacity of respondents’ organizations are 
independent of each other.  
Research hypothesis:  Impact and the analytical capacity of participants’ organizations 
are not independent of each other. 
 
 As an extension of research question, these hypotheses examine the link between impact 
and the analytical capacity of respondents’ organizations.  The results appear in Table 8.20.  Of 
those who agreed that their organizations had adequate capacity to conduct policy analysis about 
72.0 percent felt that SAPRI had had a positive impact on public policy since it was undertaken.  
Out of the 62 persons who expressed no opinion on the analytical capacity of their organizations, 
77.4 percent nevertheless agreed that SAPRI had positively affected public policy, while another 
16.1 percent had no views on either issue.  The various p-values suggest that the relationship 
between the impact and organizations’ analytical capacity is relatively weak, but statistically 
significant.  This means that a strong capacity to analyze public policy, including the effects of a 
participatory forum on such forum, is important but not enough to adequately assess this link.  
Subjective evaluations drawing on the institutional capacity of the respective organizations may 
have to be complemented with structured assessment that measure both outputs of policy and the 
observed impact of those outputs on particular socio-economic phenomenon. 
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Table 8-20   Relationship Between Impact and Analytical Capacity of Participants’ Organizations 
    
My Organization Had the Capacity to 
Provide Policy Analysis for SAPRI Total 
    Disagree No Opinion Agree   
SAPRI Has 
influenced Public 
Policy in Ghana 
(IMPACT) 
 
Disagree 
 
Frequency 0 4 2 6
    Percent within column 
responses .0% 6.5% 14.3% 6.7%
  No Opinion Frequency 8 10 2 20
    Percent within column 
responses 61.5% 16.1% 14.3% 22.5%
  Agree Frequency 5 48 10 63
    Percent within column 
responses 38.5% 77.4% 71.4% 70.8%
Total Total Count 13 62 14 89
  Total Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square and Correlation Tests 
  Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.728 4 .005 
 
  Value Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .145 .194 
  Gamma .272 .194  
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8.7.3. Relationship between Impact and Economic Literacy of Participants  
Null hypothesis:  Impact and the economic literacy of participants are independent of 
each other.  
Research hypothesis:  Impact and the analytical capacity of participants’ organizations 
are not independent of each other. 
 As Table 8.21 shows, out of those who considered the usefulness of the economic literacy 
workshops to their participation, 77.9 percent also agreed that SAPRI did have a positive impact 
on public policy afterwards, while an additional 19.1 percent offered no assessment of the 
economic literacy workshops or the impact of SAPRI on public policy.  Significantly, however, 
half of those who disagreed over the usefulness of the economic literacy exercise also felt that 
SAPRI had not influenced public policy afterwards, with another half proffering no views on the 
issue.  The results clearly suggest that participants, with the benefit of the economic literacy 
programs, were more discerning in their assessment of SAPRI’s effects on public policy.   
 The p-value of <.001 for the chi-square supports this conclusion, with the p-values for 
measures of strength providing additional support.  That both sets of measures should prove 
statistically significance was to be expected, because those who benefited from the economic 
literacy programs and found them useful were also those likely to be able to assess the policy 
landscape afterwards and conclude that their participation in SAPRI was worthwhile. 
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Table 8-23  Relationship between Impact and Economic Literacy of Participants 
    
Economic Literacy Seminar Prior to SAPRI 
Helped me Contribute Effectively 
 Total 
    Disagree No Opinion Agree   
SAPRI Has 
influenced Public 
Policy in Ghana 
(IMPACT) 
Disagree Frequency 
1 3 2 6
    Percent within column 
responses 50.0% 15.8% 2.9% 6.7%
  No Opinion Frequency 1 6 13 20
    Percent within column 
responses 50.0% 31.6% 19.1% 22.5%
  Agree Frequency 0 10 53 63
    Percent within column 
responses .0% 52.6% 77.9% 70.8%
Total Total Count 2 19 68 89
  Total Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square and Correlation Tests 
 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.824 4 .008 
 
  Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Error Approx. T Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .308 .109 2.562 .010 Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .597 .152 2.562 .010  
 
 
The overall findings and the preceding discussions are summarized in the table below.  
Table 8.22   SUMARRY OF BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
PROCESS ANALYTICAL CAPACITY ECONOMIC LITERACY  
Chi-sq. Tau-b Gamma Chi-sq. Tau-b Gamma Chi-sq. Tau-b Gamma 
INCLUSIVENESS 
  Coefficient 
  P-value 
 
20.257 
.000 
 
.381 
.000 
 
.620 
.000 
 
8.425 
.077 
 
.189 
.071 
 
.361 
.071 
 
12.119 
.016 
 
.300 
.002 
 
.629 
.002 
VOICE               
Coefficient 
    P-value 
 
16.757 
.002 
 
.353 
.000 
 
.693 
.000 
 
10.777 
.029 
 
.200 
.089 
 
.439 
.089 
 
7.396 
.116 
 
.179 
.127 
 
.425 
.127 
 
 
        
6.169 .188 .340 14.728 .145 .207 13.824 .308 .597 
IMPACT  
  Coefficient 
  P-value 
.187 .056 .056 .005 .194 .194 .004 .101 .010 
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8.8. ELABORATION ON BIVARIATE ANALYSIS WITH CONTROLS 
 
 Up to this point, the analysis has not considered the possibility that factors other than 
those under consideration here – process, analytical capacity of respondents’ organization, and 
economic literacy of participants – may completely or partially influence successful participation 
at a forum, in terms of voice, inclusiveness, and impact. For example, as a result of culture, 
social conventions, and experience, public policies tend to affect men and women differently and 
they in turn tend to see and experience social and economic reality differently.  Elson (1995), for 
instance, has extensively documented what she calls “male bias” in macro economic policies 
under structural adjustment (see, also, Boserup, 1970; Scott, 1995; Çagatay, 1998).] Similarly, a 
person’s educational background and region of residence may influence the way they view 
successful participation. As such a person’s ability to participate successfully and effectively is 
as much determined by their ability to read and write as their access to all forms of physical and 
institutional infrastructure (Gran, 1983; Friedmann, 1992).  On the basis of this assertion, the 
preceding bivariate analysis is elaborated upon in the following section by controlling for 
respondents’ sex, educational background, and region of residence.  The intent is to help 
understand better some of the results obtained so far.  For reasons of space, the entire output for 
the elaboration is reproduced as Appendices A, B, and C.  The table below represents only a 
summary of that output.  
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Table 8-23  RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS USING CONTROLS 
 
(Each p-value refers to correlation values for (tau-b and gamma)  for each bivariate relation, with the appropriate 
controlling variable, unless otherwise stated.) 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
DEPENDENT  Vs. 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
 
Sex  
 
 
Education Levels 
 
Region 
of Residence 
 
 
Inclusiveness vs: 
 
 
 
M 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
First 
Degree/ 
Certificate 
 
Tertiary 
Master’s/ 
Higher 
 
 
 
GA 
UW,U
E, 
NR, 
CR 
 
 
Other 
Regs. 
   Process .000 .800 .567 .001 .008 .571 .083 .000 
   Analytical Capacity .067 .946 .265 .028 .113 .304 .418 .074 
   Economic Literacy .006 .368 .859 .001 .153 .000 .701 .112 
Voice vs:  
   Process .001 .165 .225 .010 .186 .831 .026 .005 
   Analytical Capacity .135 .322 .289 .064 .776 .109 .412 .353 
   Economic Literacy .457 .097 .596 .160 .493 .413 .360 .114 
Impact vs:  
   Process .072 .417 .300 .211 .377 .023 1.0 .128 
   Analytical Capacity .045 .883 .225 .065 .314 .591 .133 .821 
   Economic Literacy .089 .023 .330 .083 .263 .839 .006 .114 
 
 A re-examination of the relationship between inclusiveness and process while controlling 
for the sex of respondents shows tau-b and gamma p-values of .<001 for the male category of 
respondents, the same as for all respondents combined in the bivariate analysis.  The value for 
the female category, however, was .800, much higher than .the .05 significance threshold.  This 
means that male respondents were more likely than females to view the process as facilitatory of 
inclusiveness.  This may be due to any number of social and forum-specific factors that generally 
tend militate against women’s interest, as captured in the feminist literature (Rathgeber, 1990).   
Due to a history of marginalization and exclusion, for example, may have causes women to feel 
that the organizers’ efforts at promoting equity or representation for issues, interest groups and 
administrative regions, as well-intentioned as they might have been, were simply not enough as a 
result of entrenched institutional biases against women. For advocates of WAD theories, this 
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would simply confirm their argument that pursuing equity for women in an overwhelmingly 
patriarchal society is at best an exercise in futility (Connelly, et al., 2001; Moser 1993).  
Although this may be the case, it is hard to imagine how a separatist feminist agenda, as pursued 
by WADists, can effectively address the problem.  A broad-based gender-focused agenda, that in 
part seeks to sensitize men in particular about the “hidden dangers” of participation, may be a 
better option for women in particular and society in general. 
 In the case of inclusiveness and analytical capacity, the p-values for tau-b and gamma 
(.067 for male respondents and .946 for female respondents) were, as in the bivariate analysis, 
larger than the.05 significance level.  The original finding that there was no significant 
relationship between the two variables was therefore confirmed, separately for the male and 
female subgroups of respondents.  
The relationship between inclusiveness and economic literacy, which was found to be 
significant in the bivariate analysis, was replicated for male respondents but not for female 
respondents, with tau-b and gamma p-values of .006 for males and .368 for females. It appears 
that women overall were less likely than men to have viewed the forum as all-inclusive, despite 
the pre-forum efforts by the organizers to make it as inclusive as possible.  In terms of issues, it 
could be argued that in assessing inclusiveness, women, more than men, placed more emphasis 
on the low level of attention given to child advocacy groups and children’s issues, for example. 
Indeed, when asked about their views about the adequacy of representation for child advocacy 
groups at the forum, 39.5 percent of male respondents agreed that it was adequate, with only 16.7 
percent of female respondents sharing that view.10 This confirms what has long been known in 
the development literature that the welfare of children is inseparable from that of their mothers 
 
10   More specifically, 4.3 percent of male respondents said they “strongly” agreed with the statement that children’s 
advocacy groups were adequately represented; no female respondents shared that view.  
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(Stack, 1978; Moon, 1991) and the need to consider both groups jointly in the formulation of 
social and economic policies. 
With respect to process and its effects on participants’ assessment of inclusiveness, male 
dominance – common in many aspects of Ghanaian society– appeared have played a greater part 
in the allotment of speaking opportunities, for example, than one would have expected, in view 
of the organizers’ efforts at fairness and inclusiveness, once again reinforcing the view by some 
feminist advocates that every effort, either by the state or civil society organizations, aimed at 
promoting equity must necessarily always be preponderant towards women, due to entrenched 
initial inequities (Molyneux, 1985). 
  When controlling for the possible effects of education, the relationship between 
inclusiveness and process was replicated for only respondents with tertiary education (first 
degrees/certificate or higher); the relationship between the two for participants with education up 
to the secondary school level proved insignificant.  The tau-b and gamma p-value was .028 for 
first-degree/certificate holders, compared to .265 for those with up to secondary school education 
and those with graduate education or higher.  It could be that people with generally high levels of 
education, for example, were more knowledgeable about the issues and thus more confident in 
getting themselves noticed by the moderators. Or perhaps they had better information, by virtue 
of their education levels, to be able to evaluate issues and groups representativeness.  With 
respect to inclusiveness and analytical capacity, which was found not to be significant during the 
bivariate analysis, the relationship was found to be significant for tertiary first degree-certificate 
holders only. In any case, this finding suggests the need to “democratize” participation to guard 
against academic hegemony, where only those with very high levels of education are heard, at 
the expense of those who may not have such levels of education but nevertheless have important 
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lessons and experiences to share and to influence public policy.  (Strinati, 1995).  Generally 
speaking, it appears that participants with higher levels of education were the most likely to draw 
on the analytical capabilities of their organizations to form opinions about the inclusiveness of 
the forum.  It is significant to note that for first-degree holders also, the relationship between 
inclusiveness and economic literacy also remained significant (as was the case under bivariate 
analysis), while it wasn’t for those with lower or higher levels of education.  The p-value for the 
up-secondary school sub-group was .859, compared to .011 for the first-degree/certificate sub-
group and .153 for those with higher levels of education. 
 When considering respondents’ region of residence, the relationship between 
inclusiveness and the other variables also showed some important differences.  For example, 
respondents from regions other than Greater Accra and the four regions designated the poorest 
by the Ghana Statistical Service (Upper East and West, Northern, and Central Regions), were 
less likely to follow the general trend and link process positively to inclusiveness.  The p-values 
for Greater Accra, the group of four regions, and the remaining group of regions, respectively, 
were .571, .083, and <.001.  As regards inclusiveness and the policy-analytical capacity of 
respondents’ organization, the original finding of no statistical relationship among all 
respondents was replicated among regional sub-groups as well. The p-values were .304, .418, 
and 074, respectively, for Greater Accra, the four poorest regions, and the other regions as a 
group.  Finally, the relationship between economic literacy and inclusiveness, which was found 
to be significant among all respondents, was replicated for respondents in Greater Accra only, 
where the p-value was .<001 – highly significant.  The value for the four regions was .701 and 
for the other regions it was .112.  Could the economic literacy workshops have been less 
effective in these regions than in Greater Accra?  That’s a possibility worth further exploration.   
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However, in terms of regional development, the case can be made, theoretically and empirically, 
that regions of a nation that suffer from severe lack of social and physical infrastructure are ill-
suited to participate meaningfully in the policy formation process. And this is likely to lead to a 
cycle of under-development, as diminished participation means a diminished capacity to 
influence the equitable distribution of resources for national and regional development. 
 As with inclusiveness, voice had a high degree of association with process in the 
bivariate analysis, with p-values of <.001 for each of the measures of association.  Once the 
possible effects of other factors are accounted for, however, the relationship between the two 
variables becomes more nuanced and discriminatory among various sub-groups.  Those from 
Greater Accra were less inclined to associate process with voice than those from other parts of 
the country.  The p-value for Greater Accra was .831, compared with .026 for the four poorest 
regions and .005 for the other five regions combined.   The absence of any association between 
analytical capacity and voice established in the earlier analysis, however, was replicated here, 
with p-values of .109, .412, and .353 for Greater Accra, for the four poorest regions and the other 
regions, respectively.   This means that one’s region of residence had nothing to do with their 
views on the relationship between process and voice, just as the larger population did. A similar 
conclusion was reached when region of residence was held constant in re-evaluating the 
relationship between economic literacy and voice.  The lack of statistically significant  
relationship between the two variables was confirmed across all three groups of regions, judging 
by their respective p-values:  Greater Accra (.413); four poorest regions (.360) and other regions 
(.114) While the absence of a relationship between region and voice is understandable (i.e., once 
everyone gets to the forum, the procedural arrangements – not region – determines opportunities 
to speak and to influence policy, that of process and region appears anomalous and perhaps 
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requires further probing.  This is so because the institutional and structural endowments of a 
region are likely to affect how participants prepare and engage in public forums.  
 There appears to be a difference in the ways men and women viewed the relationship 
between the forum process and voice.  The strong association between process and voice that 
was found in the bivariate analysis was replicated for men but not women.  With a p-value of 
.001, male respondents appeared to confirm the general findings while female respondents, with 
a p-value of .165, seemed to disagree. Significantly, however, the lack of a substantively 
significant relationship between voice and analytical capacity, and between voice and economic 
literacy, was replicated for both sexes, as they all had p-values that were considerably larger than 
the .05 significance level. Again, it is possible that women considered the process somewhat 
discriminatory against them in terms of their ability to state their case at the forum, while men, 
who have historically had their way in such situations, felt no such discrimination. 
8.9.  RESPONDENTS’ PRE-POST-SAPRI VIEWS ON SAPS 
 
 In addition to evaluating the hypothesized relationships between participation and the 
three explanatory variables, the study also attempted to measure the potential “biases” of 
respondents towards structural adjustment.  It was thought that due to the highly controversial 
and polarizing nature of structural adjustment programs, most respondents would have formed 
deeply entrenched positions already and would not be swayed one way or the other by the 
proceedings of the forum (e.g., see Aryeetey, 2000; Bortei-Doku-Aryeetey; 2000; Appiah, et al., 
2000). In this respect, respondents were asked their views about structural adjustment, before and 
after SAPRI.   The results appear in Table A12 below. 
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Table 8-24  Relationship Between Respondents’ Pre- and Post-SAPRI Views on Structural Adjustment 
    
Respondents’ Views on SAP Before 
SAPRI Total 
    Favorable None Unfavorable   
Respondents 
Views of SAP 
after SAPRI 
Favorable Count 
13 5 27 45 
    Percent of Views 
Before SAPRI 
(col.) 
52.0% 45.5% 50.9% 50.6% 
    % of Total 14.6% 5.6% 30.3% 50.6% 
  None Count 0 1 3 4 
    Percent of Views 
Before SAPRI 
(col.) 
.0% 9.1% 5.7% 4.5% 
    % of Total .0% 1.1% 3.4% 4.5% 
  Unfavorable Count 12 5 23 40 
    Percent of Views 
Before SAPRI 
(col.) 
48.0% 45.5% 43.4% 44.9% 
    % of Total 13.5% 5.6% 25.8% 44.9% 
Total Count 25 11 53 89 
  Percent of Views 
Before SAPRI 
(col.) 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 28.1% 12.4% 59.6% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.950 4 .745 
 
  
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.019 .856
  Gamma -.034 .856
 
Fifty-three persons (representing about 60 percent of the total respondents) reported having an 
unfavorable view of structural adjustment before SAPRI.  Of those, 43.4 percent said they 
maintained that view after the forum, while another 5.7 percent expressed continued to have no 
opinions about structural adjustment.  However, just over one half of those who had an 
unfavorable view of structural adjustment prior to SAPRI reported having a favorable view 
afterwards.  At the other extreme, 48.0 percent who had a favorable view of structural adjustment 
reported an unfavorable view afterwards, with another 52.0 percent who had a favorable view 
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prior to SAPRI maintaining that view afterwards.  Of those who expressed no opinion about 
structural adjustment before the forum, 45.5 percent ended up having an unfavorable view of it, 
while another 45.5 percent reported having a favorable view. Still others had rather critical views 
of the World Bank an the IMF, with one respondent calling on the two organizations to “drop 
their rigid laws to avoid the Ecuador experience,” in apparent reference to street riots that greeted 
IMF-inspired austerity measures in that Latin  American country.  (See Salami, Appendix D).   
Overall, therefore, it appears that respondents did not allow their prejudices about 
structural adjustment to influence their assessment of it during SAPRI.  If anything those with 
unfavorable views before the forum were slightly more likely to offer a favorable view 
afterwards than those with prior favorable view were to offer unfavorable views afterwards (50.9 
percent) versus 48.0 percent).  Those who see SAPRI as a thinly disguised attempt at co-opting 
civil society may cite this finding as evidence (see, e.g., Staniland, 1985). But co-optation 
requires some quid pro quo, cooperation with the co-opting authority in exchange for some 
policy favor.  There is no evidence that that was the case at SAPRI and, as noted previously, it 
was to avoid both the appearance and reality of co-optation that the organizers decided to avoid 
World Bank financing and seek funds independently from other sources.  The favorable view of 
the respondents, thus, may be due to the fact the forum perhaps concentrated on the positive 
aspects of structural adjustment (such as the elimination of hoarding of essential commodities, 
following the elimination of price controls by government) and, perhaps due to data availability, 
concentrated less on the social aspects.  
Indeed, despite the public outcry over the deterioration in social conditions under 
structural adjustment, it was not until three years after SAPRI that the Ghana Statistical Service 
published a study on the incidence of poverty and its distribution in the country.  Within this 
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statistical vacuum, most of the evidence-based defense of structural adjustment focused on the 
macroeconomic statistics, which were generally impressive.  The various p-values confirm this 
assessment, suggesting a lack of statistically significant relationship between respondents’ pre- 
and post-SAPRI views of structural adjustment.  On the basis of the foregoing, we may conclude 
that on average respondents’ views of structural adjustment were shaped to a large extent by 
what they learned at the forum. 
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9. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
What have we learned from this study that we didn’t know before, and how can we expect 
the findings to help shape public policy in general and national-level participation in particular in 
Ghana?   
The study was an attempt to explore the black box of participation at the national level, 
to help us understand better factors that facilitate effective and useful engagement of citizens 
in economic development and build on that understanding for promoting equitable 
development in countries like Ghana. As noted by various writers (e.g., Connelly et al., 1995; 
Chambers, 1997), if economic development is to benefit society at large and not just a 
privileged few, it is imperative that the processes that ultimately determine the allocation of 
society’s resources adequately reflect the needs and perspectives of various socio-economic 
groups – particularly excluded and vulnerable groups like women and children – as well as 
administrative regions of a country.   Simply put, this means democratizing the development 
process in such a way as to accommodate the concerns of all segments of society – men and 
women, the literate and not so-literate, the privileged and the less-privileged, the physically 
handicapped and the physically strong (Clark, 1991). 
One way of accomplishing such democratization of development is through forums like 
SAPRI, where citizens get an opportunity to evaluate public policies and provide critical 
feedback for the enrichment and formulation of future policies. By directly assessing their 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the process, the participants of SAPRI who took part in 
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this study provide valuable insights into the past while helping shape the future of 
participatory development at the national level.  
The hypothesized relationship that inclusiveness in SAPRI, as a constituent measure of 
successful participation, was a positive function of the processes put in place by the organizers of 
the initiative was amply borne out by the statistics.  Since there is no way of promoting 
inclusiveness – of issues, civil society groups, and administrative regions – except through 
conscious organizational and institutional efforts, it should come as no surprise that process was 
found to be positively associated with inclusiveness.  
The hypothesized relationship between inclusiveness and the analytical capacity of 
participants’ organizations, however, was not borne out by the findings.  This result thus 
confirmed the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
two variables, contrary to what was hypothesized. It appears that it takes more than sound 
analytical capabilities of participants’ organizations for there to be effective advocacy for 
equitable representation of issues, groups and regions at a participatory episode like SAPRI 
(Roweraker, 1995; Robertson, 2001).  Process, as noted above, must be an important mediating 
factor. 
 The relationship between inclusiveness and economic literacy of participants was found 
to be significant on the basis of all three measures.  This result reflects the fact that the economic 
literacy workshops, at least to some extent, were designed to reflect the issues, groups and 
regions. Those who deemed the workshops as educationally beneficial were thus more likely to 
see SAPRI as more inclusive than those who did not see the workshops as beneficial. This attests 
to the view that adequate education empowers the citizenry to effectively engage policy makers 
in the public policy process (Friere, 1972). 
 105 
 The relationship between voice and process also proved to be significant and strong 
across the three measures. In that the literature does not address this relationship, this study’s 
finding contributes to our understanding of factors that make it possible for citizens to bring their 
voices to bear on public policy, beyond the usual theater of public gathering in the name of 
“participatory development.” As in the case of inclusiveness, it seems self-evident and intuitively 
appealing that presentation and other arrangements at the forum would determine whether or not 
participants were able to voice their policy concerns adequately at the forum (see also  Kotz, 
1981; Feuerstain, 1986; Estrella et al.,  2001:3).  However, Strinati (1995) and those who share 
his views may counter this conclusion by arguing that what is described as a facilitatory process 
may be nothing more than the “construction of political and ideological consensus” by the 
“dominant groups in society” at the expense of various “subordinate groups”.  But such a 
conclusion seems to ignore the possibility of “autonomous action” which all civil society 
organizations are capable of taking, except in politically repressive states, which Ghana is not 
(Staniland, 1985; Gramsci, 1972). 
The findings did not provide support for a relationship between voice, on the one hand, 
and analytical capacity and economic literacy, on the other.  One interpretation of this result is 
that analytical capacity only creates the potential for exercising voice in a participatory episode, 
and that beyond the knowledge such capacity may produce, other factors (notably process) 
influence whether one is able to make the necessary policy demands at a forum.  This is also an 
important finding that should inform further implementation of “capacity building” programs for 
civil society organizations in developing countries, in that capacity development should not be 
conceived as an end result but a means for facilitating effective participation. 
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 The same observation may be made of economic literacy and voice:  One requires more 
than such literacy to be able to make adequate policy demands in a participatory episode.  As 
reported in Chapter 8, these variables were not found to be significant. Within a participatory 
episode, therefore, process appears to be an unambiguous and the strongest indicator of success, 
in terms of inclusiveness and voice.  The relationships between inclusiveness and voice, on the 
one hand, and analytical capacity and economic literacy, on the other, were mixed, at best (see 
also Servaes 1995; Taylor, 1996).  
 No statistically significant relationship was found between impact and process. This 
overall result is not surprising, since process was an intra-episode phenomenon and could not 
reasonably have been expected to explain participants’ views of the impact of SAPRI on public 
policy.  There was some, albeit inconsistent, evidence for a significant relationship between 
analytical capacity and inclusiveness. .  This result is similar to the one obtained from the voice-
analytical capacity analysis.  What this suggests is that while there may exist some relationship 
between an organization’s analytical capacity and participants’ assessment of the impact of their 
involvement on public policy, that relationship is too weak to be substantively relevant.  A 
conscious effort to use that analytical capacity to evaluate the impact of participation, through 
evaluative and impact studies, for example, may therefore be required (Cooke and Kothari, 2001 
 Economic literacy, which was antecedent to SAPRI, turned out to have an across-the-
board significant relationship to impact, a post-forum phenomenon.  This finding is in line 
with the finding that economic literacy workshops may have equipped the 
participants/respondents with the skills to be able to examine public policies after SAPRI to 
be able to determine whether or not SAPRI has a positive impact on public policy. The 
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participation literature in general also supports such a conclusion (e.g., see Friedmann, 1992; 
Crosby, 2000; and Conyers, 2001). 
 The study also examined possible variations in responses based on respondents’ sex, 
education level, and region of residence.  As expected, there were significant differences in 
responses associated with these factors.  Women, for example, were less likely to view the 
SAPRI process as facilitatory of inclusiveness, possibly the result of not just forum-specific 
factors but a long-standing sense of alienation from development activities generally.  This is 
amply reflected in the gender and feminist literature on social exclusion and participation 
(e.g., see Connelly et al., 1995; Rathgeber, 1990).  Another major area of divergence of 
views was the issue of children’s welfare.  Overwhelmingly, women – traditionally the 
primary care givers for children – were more likely than men to report that the forum did not 
adequately address children’s issues. From a policy standpoint, this means that 
disproportionate efforts will always have to be made to ensure, at the minimum, a sense of 
inclusion among segments of the society that have traditionally been marginalized in the 
development process, notably women and children  (see Stack, 1978).  In other instances, 
such as the relationship between inclusiveness and analytical capacity, the original finding of 
no statistically significant relationship was replicated, meaning that both mean and women 
shared similar views on the issue.  
 Respondents with higher levels of education tended to see the process as more inclusive 
and facilitatory of voice; they also were the most likely to view the pre-SAPRI economic 
literacy workshops as beneficial for the exercise.  The policy implication here is that in the 
future forums of this nature must guard against “academic hegemony”, where the highly 
literate or formally educated derive the greatest benefit from participation. 
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Bridging Perceptions and Reality in Public Policy 
 
Studies of this nature that attempt to link citizens’ perceptions or observations to public 
policy inevitably raise questions about the extent to which those perceptions do in fact reflect 
reality (see Augustinos and Walker, 1996; Conroy, 1998).  But this dichotomy between 
perception and reality is gradually becoming a thing of the past, as researchers emphasize the 
complementarity or synergy between the two domains rather than holding one superior to the 
other. After all, perceptions, whatever they may be, are formed in and influence by the wider 
social reality that conventional researchers seem to prefer, and even if “inaccurate”, 
perceptions shape individuals’ behavior. The excessive emphasis on the “hard indicators” of 
social reality means that too often the “soft” yet critical human element of development is 
lost in the formulation of development policies, such that living conditions may be declining 
even as the aggregate hard indictors seem to reflect general progress. 
This was the case with Ghana’s structural adjustment program and its much-vaunted 
“macroeconomic miracle,” which occurred against a background of deteriorating social 
conditions for many Ghanaians.  Back then, no citizen had the chance to provide alternative 
views of social reality to policy makers, and those policy makers were thus left to cling to 
their illusions of progress until “time made them a victim,” to use the expression of the 
reggae group, Third World. 
Now, things are beginning to change.  Bouckaert and Walle (2003) and Klaveren et al. 
(2004) are among researchers who argue that recent “increased attention on accountability” 
in public policy in particular and governance in general warrants the skillful use of both 
“soft” and “hard” indicators in policy research (see also Loewenstein and Elster (1992; and 
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Praag and Carbonell, 2004). Klaveren et al. have argued as follows:  “Through self-reported 
measures, the respondent has the opportunity to express, in some integrated and standardized 
format, information that only she or he has access to ... Objective indicators alone do little to 
inform policy makers about public preferences.”  In developing countries, the use of 
participatory poverty assessments (PPA), where the poor are given a chance to see poverty 
through their own eyes and not the analytical prisms of outside technocrats, has gained great 
prominence in recent years as a supplement to household surveys of poverty that 
governments used for their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). 
In preparing its PRSP, known locally as the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), the 
Ghanaian government’s researchers discovered from their PPA that most people had 
different and more variegated definitions of poverty than what was offered in the Fourth 
Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS4).  In addition to conventional measures of poverty, 
such as malnutrition and low asset ownership that were reported in GLSS4, some 
respondents cited “loss of dignity”, a soft indicator that was not mentioned in GLSS4, as part 
of their conception of poverty (Government of Ghana, GPRS, 2003).  This discovery 
informed the government’s decision to be consciously “sensitive” in dealing with the poor 
around the country. 
In a similar way, it is expected that the views of respondents in this study would 
contribute to a fuller and richer understanding of the challenges of development in general and 
the fight against poverty in particular by tapping into the perceptions as well as the social and 
policy preferences of the citizenry, attributes that too often are omitted from hard-indictor policy 
research. In this study, for example, respondents (especially women respondents) consistently 
reported that children’s issues received less attention during SAPRI and have done so since then.  
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As a confirmation of respondents’ perception, the Ghana Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 
(CWIQ) produced by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS 2003) revealed extensive deterioration 
in child welfare indicators between 1997, the year SAPRI was initiated, and 2003, when the 
survey for this study was conducted (see Table 9.1 below).11  The steep rise in the proportion of 
Ghanaian children who are “wasting” (losing weight due to inadequate food intake) increased 
from 6.5 percent in 1997 to 19.3 percent 2003, reflects nothing short of a crisis in the country’s 
policy on children – a sentiment alluded to in the responses of the participants, especially 
women. If the welfare of children had been forcefully articulated at SAPRI and appropriate 
policies pursued thereafter, it is highly unlikely that the well-being of Ghana’s children would 
have declined as dramatically as it did.  This validation of hard socio-economic indicators by the 
“soft” perceptions of the citizenry supports the view, stated earlier, that both realms of social 
reality measurement should be considered in the policy development and analysis arenas.  
Table 9.1  'Reality' of Declining Child Welfare Reflects 'Perceptions' of Respondents 
Changes in Child Nutrition Indicators, 1997 and 2003 
 1997 2003 
Stunted 29.9 34.3 
Wasted 6.5 19.3 
Underweight 26.0 35.8 
Source: CWIQ, Ghana Statistical Service.  
 
1. Dynamics of Citizens’ Expectations from Forums 
 
As discussed earlier, citizen engagement in the policy process, among other things, can 
improve the quality of public policy, promote democratic development, help reduce social 
alienation, and in many cases provide legitimacy for policies that otherwise might be too 
controversial or unpopular for effective implementation.  But the relationship between citizen 
                                                 
11   Stunted children are not growing due to inadequate nutrition; wasting results from lack of enough food, 
irrespective of nutritional content; and being underweight means a deprivation of both (malnutrition). 
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engagement and citizen satisfaction with policy outcomes is not always so straightforward 
and may be conditioned by several factors over which policy makers may or may not have 
adequate control.  For example, once citizens are given a sense of belonging through their 
participation in a development forum, they expect future policies to reflect part or all of their 
contributions or policy demands.  Where such expectations are consistently not met, citizens 
become cynical towards future participatory forums and retreat deeper into their shells of 
alienation.  To the extent that their participation in the formulation and implementation of 
public policy is essential to policy legitimacy, such participatory anti-climax requires the 
attention of policy researchers and policy makers alike.   
2. SAPRI and Knowledge Utilization in Ghana’s Policy Environment 
Beyond the self-reported assessments of SAPRI by its participants, one may also want to 
know if the exercise was worthwhile beyond its immediate objectives in terms of civil societies’ 
ability to influence public policy.  Or was SAPRI ultimately a skillful attempt by the World Bank 
to “shut up” its critics by pretending to collaborate with them?  This question is pertinent because 
several authors (e.g., Nelson, 1995; Paul 1996; and Malena, 2000) have variously questioned the 
motives of the World Bank in particular and other international financial institutions in general in 
their attempts to engage civil society in policy making, after years of dismissing civil society 
organizations as a nuisance at best and ignorant about the intricacies of development at worst.  
Paul (1996: 2), for example, argues that efforts by the World Bank to work with civil society do 
“give the Bank an appearance of openness and accountability, but in the final analysis these 
efforts do not change the essence of power at the Bank or in the affected countries.”  The results, 
he concludes, is that “NGOs will have to work by persuasion; they will not have any direct voice 
in the Bank’s decision-making process nor in its fundamental mission.”  
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The final report of the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network 
(SAPRIN), published in April 2002, appears to confirm the judgment of Paul (1996).  The failure 
of SAPRIN to get the Bank to respond to and possibly act on the findings or recommendations of 
SAPRIN from 10 countries is captured in the following passage from SAPRIN’s report, titled, 
The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis and Poverty: 
While the World Bank insisted upon, and fully participated in, collaborative 
efforts throughout all phases of the SAPRI process, it chose to leave it to 
SAPRIN to synthesize the joint national reports into a final global report.  
SAPRIN presented a draft synthesis to Bank officials at a meeting in 
Washington in July 2001 in accordance with the latter’s agreement and 
commitment to discuss, at the highest levels of the institution, concrete 
changes in macroeconomic policy and policymaking based on the field 
findings and conclusions.  SAPRIN received no such feedback from Bank 
management at that meeting and has yet to receive any subsequent response 
from the Bank, including President Wolfensohn and his office.  In fact, the 
Bank officially withdrew from SAPRI as the report was delivered and has 
yet to explain to the thousands of organizations that participated in the 
SAPRI exercises or to the donors that financed them what follow-up actions 
it is taking. (SAPRIN, 2002: 3). 
 
The behavior of the World Bank may provide ammunition to critics and cynics who view 
civic participation in the policy process as nothing more than an exercise in futility, a pretext for 
co-optation or the “construction of political and ideological consensus” by the “dominant groups 
in society” at the expense of “subordinate groups”. (Strinati, 1995).  But that would amount to an 
unwarranted and overly broad indictment of a process that has been used in other countries with 
remarkable success, in terms of the citizens’ ability to influence policy collectively or even 
individually.  In Switzerland, for example, civil society organizations, and even individuals, in 
addition to political bodies like the Federal Parliament and administrative department, have all 
exercised involvements in the policy process that range from initiating particular policy 
proposals to participating in debates by the Federal Council that eventually lead to tangible 
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policy changes (Wyss and Widner, 2001). Similarly, the Irish “social partnership agreements” of 
the 1980s, comprising some 19 “social partners” representing the “four pillars” of Irish society 
(employer and business organizations; trade unions; farmer organizations; and community and 
voluntary organizations), have been credited with helping reverse the country’s economic and 
social fortunes from stagnation to growth and development (World Bank 2000).  Civil society 
thus can play a useful and influential role in the policy process at the national level, at least at 
certain times in some contexts.  
 The key difference between “developed” countries like Switzerland and Ireland and 
developing countries like Ghana in making an exercise like SAPRI relevant to the policy process 
is what one may call the “dual constituency problem” in poor aid-dependent countries.  While 
public policy in the former group of countries responds primarily to the needs and demands of 
their domestic electorates, policy makers in the latter group must simultaneously address the 
needs of their domestic constituencies (who can vote them in or out of office but do not have the 
resources to finance development) and external constituencies like the World Bank (which wield 
no electoral power but use their financial muscle to pursue policies often considered more 
ideological than pragmatic).  The result is a lack of policy autonomy or policy space for 
developing countries to pursue national policies that reflect the electorally expressed aspiration 
of their people and their peculiar political circumstances.  In the end, the policy demands of their 
electorates may be subordinated to ideology-driven conditionalities of the World Bank and the 
IMF. 
 In the case of SAPRI, while the World Bank may have disengaged from the exercise, 
there is reason to believe that it in fact later hijacked the notion of civil engagement in national-
level policy making and, along with the IMF, deployed it in the poverty reduction strategy papers 
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(PRSPs) that were launched in 1999 for debt-distressed poor countries.  Those applying for debt 
relief under HIPC had to produce PRSPs “through a broad-based participatory process” (IMF, 
1999; World Bank, 1999).  Ghana was one of 41 countries that produced PRSPs under these 
participatory conditions.  The impact of that participation on public policy, however, seems to 
vary along the lines of the instrumental and conceptual distinctions in knowledge use discussed 
earlier. 
Civil society was extensively involved in the preparation of the Ghana’s PRSP.  As 
shown in Table 9.2, however, the government’s ability to incorporate the policy demands of civil 
society in decision making seems to have depended on whether the resulting changes are 
instrumental (hence routine and non-controversial) or conceptual (which requires substantive 
policy change and which external benefactors might not approve).  In the case of the price 
controls noted above, it should be clear that no government operating under the tutelage of the 
World Bank and IMF can autonomously implement policies that amount to price controls or 
other ideology-driven policies, the inherent benefits of civic engagement notwithstanding. The 
larger political context within which civic participation occurs is therefore as important as the 
inherent act of participation in influencing public policy in developing countries. For countries 
like Ghana, the best way to derive the maximum benefits from participatory development is to 
develop, in the long run, an indigenous capacity for financing their development, and thus 
obviating (or at least reducing) the need to turn the World Bank of the IMF. 
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Table 9.2   Civic Engagement in Ghana's PRSP – Excerpts from the GPRS 
 
Civil Society Comment Government Response/Reaction  
Increasing access of urban poor to safe 
water should be included 
Suggestion incorporated. 
No analysis of why people are poor. This is now dealt with in the definition of 
poverty. 
There is a need to give greater focus on 
people with disabilities. 
This is being given greater emphasis in 
current draft. 
Extent of consultation with civil society not 
revealed. 
This has now been elaborated in a section 
on the process of preparing GPRS. 
Government must implement some form of 
pricing policy for selected items. 
This concern is understood. However, this 
is a controversial issue which requires 
further examination before a workable 
solutions. 
GPRS 2003-2005, pp. 216-220.  
 
Directions for Future Research 
 
This study represents an attempt to create a framework for the quantitative measurement 
of success of national-level participation, beyond the descriptive measures that are currently in 
vogue (e.g., UNDP, 2001).  While these descriptive measures provide a general and unquantified 
“feel” for the processes of participation, it is important, in this “age of measurement”, that policy 
makers, policy researchers, and civil society advocates have a structured and predictable notion 
of the dynamics of participation and draw on that understanding to improve both participation 
and the broader policy process as the challenges of national development continue to unfold in 
developing countries. 
 
The three major components of the framework, as discussed above, are, voice (the ability to 
make policy demands at participatory forums); inclusiveness (of social groups, policy issues, 
and regional representation); and impact (how participation affects policy choices and policy 
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outputs). Moreover, it was suggested that “success” should be broken down into intra-
episode and post-episode successes.  This should allow advocates and researchers in 
particular to determine the weak links in the participatory chain and strengthen them, rather 
than spreading themselves thin by tackling every facet of the process. 
Equally important, in any future research, it would be important to give out the questionnaire 
for measuring intra-episode success to respondents during a forum, rather than afterwards, in 
order to capture the views of those participants at their freshest. Also, because this study is 
largely exploratory, relying on a relatively small sample, conscious efforts should also be 
made to apply to the resulting framework to a much larger sample size.  This should help to 
establish the robustness or otherwise of the framework. To be able to measure impact or post-
episode better, one also needs to document the key policy demands made and accepted at the 
forum and directly evaluate future policy initiatives or documents against those demands.  It 
must be noted, however, that it would be unrealistic to expect that all these policy demands 
would be incorporated into future policy, since very often political, technical, and financial 
matters influence both policy choices and their outcomes (see Anderson, 1994).  In view of 
the very little research in that area, I recommend combining knowledge utilization research 
with participation research as a means of strengthening our understanding of both intra- and 
post-episode success of participation. 
Finally, since I completed the dissertation, I have been involved in a number of participatory 
events, including membership in the civil society coalition that is “policing” the 
government’s preparation of the second generation of its poverty reduction strategy.  A 
constant complaint among participants is the poor “quality of participation”. For example, 
during a seminar on May 26, 2005, at the Institute for Democratic Governance in Accra on 
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Ghana’s Poverty Reduction, the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the 
Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organizations in Development repeatedly 
complained about the limited time they have to make submissions to the revised poverty 
reduction document. While the members of this coalition are invited to share their views or 
experiences in policy making, they say that they are invited on such short notice that they do 
not have enough time to prepare.  In the event, their participation often amounts to little more 
their physical presence at participatory events. Although the quality of participation was 
touched upon in this study, it appears that this issue should receive much more in depth 
attention in future research. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS WITH CONTROL FOR SEX OF RESPONDENT 
 
 
1.  INCLUSIVENESS AND PROCES 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Sex of respondent   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-c .393 .089 4.390 .000Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .695 .119 4.390 .000
Male 
N of Valid Cases 71      
Kendall's tau-c .049 .195 .254 .800Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .091 .357 .254 .800
Female 
N of Valid Cases 18      
 
2. INCLUSIVENESS AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Sex of respondent   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-c .165 .090 1.834 .067Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .420 .214 1.834 .067
Male 
N of Valid Cases 71      
Kendall's tau-c -.012 .182 -.068 .946Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma -.030 .446 -.068 .946
Female 
N of Valid Cases 18      
 
 
3. INCLUSIVENESS AND ECONOMIC LITERACY 
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Sex of respondent   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-c .207 .075 2.766 .006Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .659 .172 2.766 .006
Male 
N of Valid Cases 71      
Female Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-c .160 .178 .900 .368
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Gamma .448 .483 .900 .368
N of Valid Cases 18      
 
 
4. VOICE AND PROCESS 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Sex of respondent   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-c .227 .067 3.369 .001Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .697 .125 3.369 .001
Male 
N of Valid Cases 71      
Kendall's tau-c .370 .267 1.390 .165Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .625 .359 1.390 .165
Female 
N of Valid Cases 18      
 
 
5. VOICE AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Sex of respondent   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-c .093 .062 1.496 .135Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .433 .254 1.496 .135
Male 
N of Valid Cases 71      
Kendall's tau-c .284 .286 .991 .322Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .469 .453 .991 .322
Female 
N of Valid Cases 18      
 
 
6. VOICE AND ECONOMIC LITERACY 
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Sex of respondent   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-c .045 .061 .745 .457Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .253 .297 .745 .457
Male 
N of Valid Cases 71      
Kendall's tau-c .333 .201 1.662 .097Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .692 .250 1.662 .097
Female 
N of Valid Cases 18      
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7. IMPACT AND PROCESS 
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Sex of respondent   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-c .145 .080 1.798 .072Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .345 .180 1.798 .072
Male 
N of Valid Cases 71      
Kendall's tau-c .176 .217 .812 .417Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .322 .383 .812 .417
Female 
N of Valid Cases 18      
 
 
8. IMPACT AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Sex of respondent   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-c .141 .070 2.002 .045Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .457 .204 2.002 .045
Male 
N of Valid Cases 71      
Kendall's tau-c -.037 .253 -.147 .883Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma -.063 .421 -.147 .883
Female 
N of Valid Cases 18      
 
 
9. IMPACT AND ECONOMIC LITERACY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Sex of respondent   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-c .128 .075 1.703 .089Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .481 .209 1.703 .089
Male 
N of Valid Cases 71      
Kendall's tau-c .407 .179 2.276 .023Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .846 .157 2.276 .023
Female 
N of Valid Cases 18      
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS WITH CONTROL FOR LEVEL OF EDUCATION 
 
 
 
1. INCLUSIVENESS AND PROCESS  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Education Level in 
Three Categories-   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .187 .319 .572 .567Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .333 .544 .572 .567
Up to Second 
School 
N of Valid Cases 9     
Kendall's tau-b .395 .120 3.219 .001Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .633 .159 3.219 .001
Tertiary First 
Degrees/Diplomas 
N of Valid Cases 53     
Kendall's tau-b .404 .131 2.663 .008Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .699 .173 2.663 .008
Beyond First 
Degree/Diploma 
N of Valid Cases 
24     
 
 
2. INCLUSIVENESS AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Education Level in 
Three Categories-   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b -.316 .168 -1.114 .265Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma -1.000 .000 -1.114 .265
Up to Second 
School 
N of Valid Cases 9     
Kendall's tau-b .287 .122 2.200 .028Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .553 .215 2.200 .028
Tertiary First 
Degrees/Diplomas 
N of Valid Cases 53     
Kendall's tau-b .244 .141 1.585 .113Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .486 .242 1.585 .113
Beyond First 
Degree/Diploma 
N of Valid Cases 
24     
. 
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3. INCLUSIVENESS AND ECONOMIC LITERACY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Education Level in 
Three Categories-   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .060 .335 .178 .859Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .143 .787 .178 .859
Up to Second 
School 
N of Valid Cases 9     
Kendall's tau-b .352 .108 2.551 .011Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .820 .171 2.551 .011
Tertiary First 
Degrees/Diplomas 
N of Valid Cases 53     
Kendall's tau-b .246 .164 1.427 .153Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .474 .303 1.427 .153
Beyond First 
Degree/Diploma 
N of Valid Cases 
24     
 
 
4. VOICE AND PROCESS  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Education Level in 
Three Categories-   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b 
.(c)     
Up to Second 
School 
N of Valid Cases 9     
Tertiary First 
Degrees/Diplomas 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .311 .117 2.241 .025
Gamma .688 .196 2.241 .025
N of Valid Cases 53     
Kendall's tau-b .335 .157 2.076 .038Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .558 .230 2.076 .038
Beyond First 
Degree/Diploma 
N of Valid Cases 24     
 
c  No statistics are computed because Y1-Voice2 =  Views successfully expressed at SAPRI 1.1 is a constant. 
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5. VOICE AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Education Level in 
Three Categories-   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b 
.(c)     
Up to Second 
School 
N of Valid Cases 9     
Tertiary First 
Degrees/Diplomas 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .395 .112 2.573 .010
Gamma .889 .088 2.573 .010
N of Valid Cases 53     
Kendall's tau-b .048 .180 .269 .788Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .093 .345 .269 .788
Beyond First 
Degree/Diploma 
N of Valid Cases 24     
 
c  No statistics are computed because Y1-Voice2 =  Views successfully expressed at SAPRI 1.1 is a constant. 
 
 
6. VOICE AND ECONOMIC LITERACY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Education Level in 
Three Categories-   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b 
.(c)     
Up to Second 
School 
N of Valid Cases 9     
Tertiary First 
Degrees/Diplomas 
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .253 .169 1.360 .174
Gamma .622 .249 1.360 .174
N of Valid Cases 53     
Kendall's tau-b .000 .193 .000 1.000Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .000 .385 .000 1.000
Beyond First 
Degree/Diploma 
N of Valid Cases 24     
. 
c  No statistics are computed because Y1-Voice2 =  Views successfully expressed at SAPRI 1.1 is a constant. 
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7. IMPACT AND PROCESS  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Education Level in 
Three Categories-   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .295 .208 1.037 .300Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .667 .304 1.037 .300
Up to Second 
School 
N of Valid Cases 9     
Kendall's tau-b .156 .122 1.251 .211Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .336 .245 1.251 .211
Tertiary First 
Degrees/Diplomas 
N of Valid Cases 53     
Kendall's tau-b .179 .205 .884 .377Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .256 .291 .884 .377
Beyond First 
Degree/Diploma 
N of Valid Cases 
24     
 
 
8. IMPACT AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Education Level in 
Three Categories-   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b 1.000 .000 1.212 .225Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma 1.000 .000 1.212 .225
Up to Second 
School 
N of Valid Cases 9     
Kendall's tau-b .268 .134 1.842 .065Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .571 .251 1.842 .065
Tertiary First 
Degrees/Diplomas 
N of Valid Cases 53     
Kendall's tau-b -.178 .172 -1.007 .314Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma -.288 .272 -1.007 .314
Beyond First 
Degree/Diploma 
N of Valid Cases 
24     
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9. IMPACT AND ECONOMIC LITERACY 
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
Education Level in 
Three Categories-   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b -.189 .114 -.973 .330Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma -1.000 .000 -.973 .330
Up to Second 
School 
N of Valid Cases 9     
Kendall's tau-b .322 .159 1.735 .083Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .698 .196 1.735 .083
Tertiary First 
Degrees/Diplomas 
N of Valid Cases 53     
Kendall's tau-b .221 .193 1.119 .263Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .366 .300 1.119 .263
Beyond First 
Degree/Diploma 
N of Valid Cases 
24     
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS WITH CONTROL FOR REGIONS 
 
 
 
 
1. INCLUSIVENESS AND PROCESS  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
3 Clusters of 
Regions   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .123 .214 .566 .571Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .195 .332 .566 .571
Greater Accra 
N of Valid Cases 21     
Kendall's tau-b .333 .183 1.733 .083Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .558 .277 1.733 .083
UW,UE,NR,CR 
N of Valid Cases 25     
Kendall's tau-b .510 .115 4.202 .000Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .808 .117 4.202 .000
Others 
N of Valid Cases 43     
 
 
2. INCLUSIVENESS AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY 
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
3 Clusters of 
Regions   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .238 .222 1.029 .304Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .400 .347 1.029 .304
Greater Accra 
N of Valid Cases 21     
Kendall's tau-b .156 .194 .810 .418Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .283 .349 .810 .418
UW,UE,NR,CR 
N of Valid Cases 25     
Kendall's tau-b .257 .132 1.784 .074Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .586 .278 1.784 .074
Others 
N of Valid Cases 43     
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3. INCLUSIVENESS AND ECONOMIC LITERACRY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
3 Clusters of 
Regions   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .592 .097 3.500 .000Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma 1.000 .000 3.500 .000
Greater Accra 
N of Valid Cases 21     
Kendall's tau-b .068 .176 .384 .701Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .152 .396 .384 .701
UW,UE,NR,CR 
N of Valid Cases 25     
Kendall's tau-b .245 .141 1.588 .112Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .600 .286 1.588 .112
Others 
N of Valid Cases 43     
 
 
4. VOICE AND PROCESS  
 Symmetric Measures 
 
3 Clusters of 
Regions   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .038 .177 .213 .831Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .077 .360 .213 .831
Greater Accra 
N of Valid Cases 21     
Kendall's tau-b .464 .177 2.229 .026Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .761 .222 2.229 .026
UW,UE,NR,CR 
N of Valid Cases 25     
Kendall's tau-b .429 .100 2.800 .005Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .860 .092 2.800 .005
Others 
N of Valid Cases 43     
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5. VOICE AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
3 Clusters of 
Regions   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .291 .160 1.604 .109Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .609 .253 1.604 .109
Greater Accra 
N of Valid Cases 21     
Kendall's tau-b .208 .247 .820 .412Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .341 .392 .820 .412
UW,UE,NR,CR 
N of Valid Cases 25     
Kendall's tau-b .123 .125 .929 .353Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .452 .351 .929 .353
Others 
N of Valid Cases 43     
 
6. VOICE AND ECONOMIC LITERACY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
3 Clusters of 
Regions   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b -.150 .176 -.819 .413Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma -.371 .467 -.819 .413
Greater Accra 
N of Valid Cases 21     
Kendall's tau-b .188 .202 .915 .360Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .400 .365 .915 .360
UW,UE,NR,CR 
N of Valid Cases 25     
Kendall's tau-b .351 .189 1.581 .114Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .737 .196 1.581 .114
Others 
N of Valid Cases 43     
 
 
7. IMPACT AND PROCESS  
 Symmetric Measures 
 
3 Clusters of 
Regions   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .355 .141 2.267 .023Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .667 .209 2.267 .023
Greater Accra 
N of Valid Cases 21     
Kendall's tau-b .000 .188 .000 1.000Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .000 .337 .000 1.000
UW,UE,NR,CR 
N of Valid Cases 25     
Others Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .228 .145 1.523 .128
 129 
Gamma .409 .233 1.523 .128
N of Valid Cases 43     
 
8. IMPACT AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
3 Clusters of 
Regions   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .117 .217 .537 .591Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .222 .403 .537 .591
Greater Accra 
N of Valid Cases 21     
Kendall's tau-b .292 .190 1.502 .133Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .500 .315 1.502 .133
UW,UE,NR,CR 
N of Valid Cases 25     
Kendall's tau-b .041 .179 .227 .821Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .079 .351 .227 .821
Others 
N of Valid Cases 43     
 
9. IMPACT AND ECONOMIC LITERACY  
 
 Symmetric Measures 
 
3 Clusters of 
Regions   Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) Approx. Sig. 
Kendall's tau-b .043 .214 .203 .839Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .100 .481 .203 .839
Greater Accra 
N of Valid Cases 21     
Kendall's tau-b .531 .152 2.754 .006Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .822 .120 2.754 .006
UW,UE,NR,CR 
N of Valid Cases 25     
Kendall's tau-b .304 .169 1.579 .114Ordinal by Ordinal 
Gamma .633 .238 1.579 .114
Others 
N of Valid Cases 43     
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APPENDIX D 
 
COMMENTS FROM RESPONDENTS ABOUT SAPRI 
 
 
? The workshop session gave the opportunity to participants to deliberate on pertinent 
subjects made during the presentations.  This helped to expose certain lapses of the 
workshop subject and to create a better way forward within the context. 
 
- Felix Kwaku, Minerals Commission  
 
? For SAPRI in Ghana, a major weakness was the inability to have the agriculture sector 
research carried out.  This was a particularly serious drawback when one considers the 
level and the role of agriculture in the economy and on any possible intervention to 
alleviate poverty, the level of women and children.   
 
- Thomas Akabzaa, University Lecturer. 
 
? In my view, findings of SAPRI should be sent to the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WT) in order that they could consider 
some of the views of civil society in beneficiary countries of SAP.  Future programs for 
SAPRI should also focus on the northern sector of Ghana… 
 
- Abubakari Adams-Sandu, Trades Union Congress.  
 
 
? Respondent feels that the time span of two years between the conference and this 
questionnaire is too long to recap all contributions that could enrich the study.  However, 
the inclusion of civil society in adopting sound macro-economic policies has been 
commendable.  The absence of the northern savannah region in the research as well as 
strong women and children advocacy groups has been a setback, which has to be 
addressed to play into the process of addressing our economic situation.  Protection of 
our industries, rights of labour and decent work as well as the creation of a level playing 
field for both developing and developed world was strongly advocated.  
 
If the World Bank is able to listen and learn as Mr. Peter Harold, then country director of 
the World Bank, noted, they should demonstrate that they are willing to change; and that 
wealth creation is fundamental to poverty alleviation.  This leads to empowerment with 
viable and sustainable jobs at the centre of the dialogue.  We would like to see the World 
Bank and the IMF drop their rigid laws to avoid the Ecuador experience, where people’s 
impatience and frustration led to the overthrow of two governments, among others. 
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-    Ms. Fati Bintu Abdul Salami, Women’s Coordinator, Ghana National Association of 
Teachers (GNAT) 
 
? SAPRI made it clear that sometimes our leaders fail to make the truth known to the 
international agencies, which bring some of these policies to developing countries as a 
way of alleviating poverty.  Mechanisms must be put in place to monitor countries that 
opt for some of these policies so that civil society groups do not continue blaming the 
international financial institutions.  Civil society must also be encouraged to be vigilant 
in their quest to ensure accountability on the part of the ruling government. 
 
-    Charles L. Kobby Gomez, Director, African Youth in Development. 
 
? World Bank policy of emphasising basic education.  It is a good idea to improve basic 
education but not at the expense of tertiary education, because those trained at the basic 
[level] will be enrolled at the tertiary [level] at the same time when resources at tertiary 
[level] have diminished. At the basic level, the government must ensure that no child is 
expelled from school or refused access to continuing schooling in any school or basic 
institution on academic grounds… 
 
-  Christiana Opoku, Ghana Education Service. 
 
? I was very happy to have been allowed to contribute my ideas and knowledge on the 
impact of mine activities, having worked in mine laboratories and safety departments 
for about 10 years. Most participants were just emotional about the effects of mining 
activities without knowing what actually goes on there.  The conference was useful, 
educative, and influential enough to impact on government policies. 
 
-  Edward T. Amanor, Department of Chemistry, KNUST 
 
? SAPRI offered me the opportunity to raise issues of concern as well as gave me the 
opportunity to learn from others.  I found it very rewarding and would wish that similar 
fora be organized to deal with issues bordering on social, political, and economic 
development.  I wish, however, to suggest that such fora could start from the district 
level to enable more people to take part, so as to broaden the participatory base of the 
discussion.  
 
-  Nana Asumadu Sakyi, Sekyere East District Assembly.  
 
? No doubt, SAPRI is a step forward over ERP and SAP.  However, the failure of the two 
previous programmes to make any significant impact on the economy of Ghana led to 
the little hope that Ghanaians attached to SAPRI. Nevertheless, the involvement of civil 
society in the decision-making has made SAPRI a unique programme over the rest. 
However, from my own experience at the conference, participants were not allowed to 
adequately express their views, even thought they were allowed to talk whenever they 
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wanted to.  Again, sometimes, one was tempted to believe that government and its 
agencies had already drawn conclusions on the issues at stake but only allowed for such 
a conference to take place for the civil society to see that they have been part of the 
decision.  My suggestion therefore is that for the purpose of meaningful development of 
our economy, government should always allow things to happen naturally and should 
minimise its intervention. 
 
-  A.B. Ibn Hassan, Young Women’s Muslim Association.  
 
?   Government must consult their citizens adequately enough before they enter into 
economic relationships with external bodies and organizations.  The citizenry must be 
educated adequately on the intricacies involved in establishing relationships in 
economic dealings with outside bodies.  Literature available on various kinds of 
economic relationships between and among donors and recipient states must be made 
widely available to the citizenry to inform them on the choices they would suggest to 
government.  
 
- Frank Coffie, VORANGO (Member). 
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Appendix E 
 
 Date: ______ 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Ghana’s ‘Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative’ 
 
NAME OF RESPONDENT:   
 
NAME OF RESPONDENT’S ORGANIZATION: 
 
POSITION IN ORGANIZATION: 
 
NOTE:  Please, read each of the statements below and respond by circling the appropriate number below a statement.  The entire 
exercise should take about 15 minutes. 
 
 
1. SECTION I 
1.1. Overall, how much of your organization’s views on the effects of structural adjustment policies were you able to 
present at the SAPRI forum? 
 
1 2 3 4 
None of them Some of them Most of them All of them 
 
1.2. The issues discussed at SAPRI reflected the concerns of Ghanaian civil society.  
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
1.3. Women’s groups were adequately represented at SAPRI.  
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
1.4. Women’s issues were adequately discussed at SAPRI. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
1.5. All the 10 administrative regions were adequately represented at SAPRI. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
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1.6. As a result of SAPRI, the state is more responsive to the concerns of civil society in the making of public policy. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
1.7.  As a result of SAPRI, government has altered its policies to reflect the concerns of civil society. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
 
2. SECTION II 
 
2.1. I was given enough time to prepare for the SAPRI forum.  
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
2.2. During the forum, I was given enough time to make presentations. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
2.3. During the forum, the moderator allowed me to make a presentation whenever I wanted to. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
2.4. Not everyone at the forum who wanted to speak was allowed to do so. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
2.5. I contributed to discussions at the Forum through (check all that apply)  
 
1. _____ Written presentations        2.  _____ Oral presentations 
 
3. _____ Both methods                   4.  _____ Other methods (specify): ________  
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3.  SECTION III 
 
3.1.  My organization has the facilities to collect information on the Ghanaian economy. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
3.2. My organization has the personnel to analyze information on economic policies. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
3.3. It is difficult to obtain information on economic policy from the government 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
  
3.4. How often does each of the facilities listed below work in your office? 
 
 1 
We Have None  
2 
Never Works  
3 
Works 
Sometimes 
4 
Works Most of 
the Time  
5 
Works All the 
Time 
Telephone _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
Fax machine _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
Computers _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
Internet access _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
 
 
4. SECTION IV 
 
4.1. The workshop on “economic literacy” that was held prior to SAPRI was highly beneficial to my contributions at 
the Forum. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
  
 
Please, continue on next page.
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4.2. For purposes of contributing to discussions about national economic policies, how would you describe your 
understanding of the following economic topics? 
 
 1 
Very Low 
2 
Low 
3 
Average 
4 
High 
5 
Very High 
Macro-economic 
policy 
 
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
Fiscal policy _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
International trade 
issues 
 
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
Government 
expenditures 
 
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
Government 
revenue 
 
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
Foreign Aid _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
Structural 
adjustment policies 
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
 
5. SECTION V 
 
5.1. Sex of respondent 
 
1. Male    2. Female 
 
5.2.  Highest education level attained. 
 
1. Primary School 
 
2.  Secondary School 
 
3.  Post–secondary non-university (e.g., commercial or technical) 
 
4.  Post-secondary university (bachelor’s degree) 
 
5. Post-secondary university (master’s degree) 
 
6. Post-secondary university (doctorate) 
 
7.  Other (please specify):      
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5.3. Region of respondent’s residence 
 
1. Greater Accra Region     
 
2.  Eastern Region 
 
3.  Western Region     
 
4.  Volta Region  
 
5.  Upper West Region    
 
6.  Upper East Region  
 
7.  Ashanti Region     
 
8.   Central Region 
 
9.   Northern Region    
 
10.   Brong-Ahafo Region  
 
5.4. What is the nature of your organization’s work (e.g., women’s advocacy, education, agriculture, etc.)? 
                        
    
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME. 
 
WOULD YOU like a summary of the study’s findings to be sent to you? 
 
   1.   Yes  2.   No 
 
 
NOTE: If you have additional views on SAPRI that you would like to share, please write them 
on the back of this page. Thank you. 
 
 
RETURN ADDRESS:  
Isaac Thompson 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs 
University of Pittsburgh 
3L14 Posvar Hall Pittsburgh 
PA  15206 
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Appendix F  
 
Letter to Participants 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
You have been selected to take part in a research study on participatory development because of 
your involvement in the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) held in 
Ghana in 2001.   
 
As you know, citizen involvement in the making of public policy at the national level has 
attained great prominence in the past decade-and-a-half as poor countries like Ghana endeavor to 
improve the living standards of the masses. It is now commonly agreed that the incorporation of 
the concerns and ideas of citizens into public policies is essential to enhancing the quality of such 
policies and making them sustainable. 
 
Not much, however, is known about the process of participatory development at the national 
level; previous developing country experiences with participation occurred almost entirely at the 
local level.  This study, The New Participation: A Case Study of Ghana’s Structural Adjustment 
Participatory Review Initiative, represents an attempt to understand the dynamics of participation 
at the national level. 
 
The knowledge gained from the study should help development practitioners, policy makers and 
civil society groups to better understand and utilize participatory processes in their activities.  
 
I would be happy, therefore, if you would take a few moments of your time and complete the 
attached questionnaire.  The entire exercise should take no more than 15 minutes.  Upon 
completion, please put the questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed and stamped envelope 
and return it.  I would appreciate it very much if you could complete and return the questionnaire 
within one week of receipt.  Be assured that all responses will be treated with the utmost 
confidentiality. 
 
If you would like to have a summary of the findings of this study, please state so at the end of the 
questionnaire.   I will be happy to send you one. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Isaac Thompson 
e-mail:  isaac@pitt.edu 
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